Empirical Essays on the U.S. Airline Industry by Lee, Jinkook
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
A Dissertation
by
JINKOOK LEE
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Chair of Committee, Steven Wiggins
Committee Members, Steven Puller
Stephanie Houghton
Ramkumar Janakiraman
Head of Department, Timothy Gronberg
May 2014
Major Subject: Economics
Copyright 2014 Jinkook Lee
ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the effects of firm’s collaborative strategy on both demand
and supply, and equilibrium to derive various welfare implications. I explain both
horizontal mergers and vertical relationships, focusing on the U.S. airline industry.
In the first study, I address significant limitations of traditional merger sim-
ulations which have focused solely on price changes while constraining the set of
product characteristics to be identical pre- and post-merger. To overcome the limita-
tions, I endogenize both prices and product characteristics by specifying a two-stage
oligopoly game. After estimating demand and supply system, I simulate the effect
of the Delta and Northwest Airlines merger on prices, product characteristics, and
welfare. The simulation results show that the merged firm tends to increase prod-
uct differentiation post-merger, the higher product differentiation reduces the firm’s
incentive to raise prices, and the changes in characteristics and prices increase not
only the merged firm’s profit but also consumer welfare. I also compare the predicted
to actual post-merger outcome and find that endogenizing product characteristics is
essential to better predict the actual outcome.
The second study investigates the impact of contractual agreements regarding
gates between airports and carriers on major carrier’s market power. Competition
Plans reported by thirty one hub airports provide information on a carrier’s gate-
occupancy, sublease agreement, and Majority-In-Interest clauses at an airport. I
estimate the effects of these contractual practices on passengers’ utility and carriers’
marginal costs. The main results show that a carrier’s gate dominance has a positive
effect on the demand side through passengers’ utility, and business travelers have a
higher willingness to pay for gates than tourists. On the supply side, a carrier’s gate
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dominance decreases its own marginal cost, especially when the airport is congested.
Furthermore, the existence of sublease agreement at an airport is likely to increase
non-signatory carriers’ marginal costs, whereas the provision of Majority-In-Interest
clauses increases signatory carriers’ marginal costs. Based on the estimates, I execute
a counterfactual analysis and find that regulatory limits on gate occupancy can
reduce the differentials in costs and profits between signatory and non-signatory
airlines.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation studies the effects of firm’s collaborative strategy on both demand
and supply, and equilibrium to derive various welfare implications. I examine both
horizontal mergers and vertical relationships, focusing on the U.S. airline industry.
Regarding the horizontal merger, Chapter II addresses significant limitations of
traditional merger simulations. The traditional simulations have focused primarily
on change in prices, while holding set of characteristics fixed at pre-merger level.
According to this setting, a merged firm is assumed to produce identical products
pre- and post-merger and to change only prices. However, literature including Peters
(2006) and Mazzeo (2003) showed that airlines have adjusted product characteristics
facing changes in market structure such as entry, exit, or a merger. Ignoring this
aspect can lead to a significant bias in predicted prices in several aspects, thus I aim
to overcome this problem by endogenizing not only prices but product characteristics
in merger analysis.
To simulate merger effects, I set up an empirical structural model of demand
and supply in differentiated product markets. Especially in the supply model, I set
up a two-stage oligopoly game where firms decide optimal product characteristics at
the first stage, and then choose optimal prices at the second stage. Specifying the
sequential choice model causes technical burden, but it is more realistic frame for
airline industry where adjusting product characteristics requires a long time.
After estimating demand and supply system, I examine the Delta and Northwest
Airlines merger, which created the largest commercial airline in the world as of 2008.
For that case, I predict post-merger equilibrium of price and product characteristics,
and analyze welfare effect. The simulation results show that (i) the merged firm
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tends to increase product differentiation post-merger by raising the quality of primary
products but largely decreasing that of secondary products. (ii) The higher product
differentiation reduces the firm’s ability of raising prices especially of the primary
products. (iii) Consumer and producer welfare changes substantially differ from
those of standard merger analyses. Specifically, I find that overall consumer surplus
increases mainly because the business travelers get welfare gains due to the quality
improvement of the primary goods. (iv) Finally, I compare the predicted to actual
post-merger outcome focusing on flight frequency, and find that endogenizing product
characteristics is essential to better predict the actual outcome. In summary, the
results highlight that analysts need to endogenize product characteristics along with
prices when simulating the effects of proposed mergers.
Chapter III addresses the second issue of vertical relationships, investigating the
role of contractual agreement on gates as a determinant of major carrier’s market
power. Vertical contracts between airlines and airports are widely used and can
benefit both parties. From an airport’s point of view, long-term contracts can in-
crease revenues by encouraging airlines to concentrate their traffics and to attract
more passengers at the airport. From a carrier’s perspective, performing a large-scale
operations contributes to increasing own market share by providing frequent flight
schedules on various routes.
Among various forms of vertical contracts, this study focuses on the case of
“signatory carriers”, referring to a setting where airlines have fully executed Use-
and-Lease Agreements with an airport authority. Under the agreements, the airport
grants three special rights to signatory airlines. First, the carriers are able to solely
occupy certain airport facilities such as departing/arriving gates, ticket counters, and
baggage claim areas for extended periods (e.g. twenty years). Second, the airline
can sublease any under-utilized facilities to other carriers possibly at premium prices.
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Finally, most large and medium sized airports allow Majority-In-Interest (MII) power
wherein signatory carriers can delay or prevent airport capital-development projects.
Several governmental reports (e.g. Department of Transportation, 1999; General
Accounting Office, 1990) point out that these contractual practices can be anti-
competitive because they can effectively limit competitors’ access to gates and other
key facilities. More recent work, Ciliberto and Williams (2010) found that the limited
access to airport facilities is a critical source of the well known hub premium.
Ciliberto and Williams (2010) uses the contractual practices as measures of the
barriers to entry and estimates a linear specification of the reduced-form pricing
equation. With this approach, the paper clarifies to what extent the operating prac-
tices explain the hub premium. However the practices, especially a carrier’s gate
control can affect not only consumer utility but also its marginal cost. In this re-
spect, the estimates from the reduced-form regression represent the net effect of the
gate control on both sides. Motivated by this aspect, I aim to extend Ciliberto and
Williams (2010) by providing more structural descriptions. The primary goal of this
paper is to identify the effects of the contractual arrangements on demand and supply
separately.
Competition Plans reported by thirty one hub airports provide information on
a carrier’s gate-occupancy, sublease agreement, and Majority-In-Interest clauses at
an airport. I estimate the effects of these contractual practices on passengers’ utility
and carriers’ marginal costs.
The main results show that a carrier’s gate dominance has a positive effect on
the demand side through passengers’ utility, and business travelers have a higher
willingness to pay for gates than tourists. On the supply side, a carrier’s gate dom-
inance decreases its own marginal cost, especially when the airport is congested.
Furthermore, the existence of sublease agreement at an airport is likely to increase
3
non-signatory carriers’ marginal costs, whereas the provision of Majority-In-Interest
clauses increases signatory carriers’ marginal costs. Based on the estimates, I ex-
ecute a counterfactual analysis and find that regulatory limits on gate occupancy
can reduce the differentials in costs and profits between signatory and non-signatory
airlines.
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CHAPTER II
ENDOGENOUS PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS IN MERGER SIMULATION:
A STUDY OF THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
II.1 Introduction
Until recently, standard merger simulations have focused solely on price changes while
implicitly constraining the set of product characteristics to be identical pre- and post-
merger.1 However, when an industry experiences a change in market structure such
as entry, exit, or a merger, firms are likely to adjust product characteristics. As
examples of the airline industry, Peters (2006) shows that a merged airline tends to
reduce flight frequency on segments where the merging carriers were competing with
each other, and Mazzeo (2003) finds that carriers are likely to deteriorate on-time
performance when markets become less competitive.2
Ignoring this aspect can lead to a significant bias in predicted prices in several
aspects. On the demand side, the set of characteristics is an important part from
which consumers derive utility. Then, it is very natural that the post-merger changes
in characteristics affect consumers’ choices and the resulting market shares of prod-
ucts. On the supply side, merging firms consolidate their production facilities and
change the way of conducting operations. This induces the combined firm to search
a new set of optimal characteristics based on changes in marginal and fixed cost.
Further, the product repositioning influences the extent of cross-price effect merged
1Throughout this paper, standard merger analysis refers to the simulation method based on
differentiated product demand and firm conduct in oligopolistic markets. This empirical model is
widely used since Berry and Pakes (1993), Berry (1994), Werden and Froeb (1994), and Berry et
al. (1995).
2Merger effect is not the primary focus of Mazzeo (2003), but the finding on the link between
market competition and product quality is closely related to this study.
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firm internalizes. Suppose that a merged firm’s products become more differentiated
than before, then cross-price elasticity between them becomes weaker so that the
firm has less ability to increase prices than standard simulations predict. However,
traditional simulations do not consider these three channels through which optimal
prices are affected. Besides the predicted prices, subsequent welfare assessments can
be biased in this sense.3
To overcome the limitations, I endogenize not only prices but also product char-
acteristics to analyze merger effects in the U.S. airline industry. To be specific, I
aim to answer the following four questions: (i) How does merged firm adjust product
characteristics? A few studies has addressed this issue by comparing ‘actual’ pre-
and post-merger data. Unlike the literature, I ‘simulate’ post-merger characteris-
tics based on pre-merger data and structural model, assuming that actual outcomes
are not available. (ii) How and to what extent does the product repositioning affect
post-merger prices? After simulating price changes, the paper analyzes how much
of the changes is caused through each of three channels (described above). Espe-
cially by separating the magnitude of cross-price elasticity, I attempt to see a change
in the firm’s ability of raising prices. (iii) How does post-merger equilibrium affect
welfare? I introduce consumer heterogeneity in preferences for the characteristics in
the demand specification. Given heterogeneous consumers, merged firm can repo-
sition various subsets of products differently. I assess welfare changes of each type
of consumers as well as profit changes by each group of products. (iv) Does endog-
enizing product characteristics contribute to better predicting post-merger outcome?
Although a large body of literature has displayed interests in merger simulation, there
has been very little studies testing this matter. With a focus on flight frequency, I
3Besides the intuitive understanding of limits, Crawford (2012) discusses potential econometric
problems associated with exogenous product characteristics.
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evaluate the predictive performance of my simulation.
The U.S. air travel market in the late 2000’s offers an ideal environment to this
research. Above all, the industry has experienced at least nine completed or on-going
mergers between 2008 and 2013, including the recently approved the American and
US Airways merger.4 Second, airline mergers involve very complicated integration
procedures on various levels. In terms of overall operations, they reform engineering,
maintenance, crew training, network design, flight schedule, and allocation of fleets.
Also production facilities such as aircraft, gates, and ticket offices are consolidated.
Regarding customer service, they create single reservation system and harmonize
frequent flier program. All these consolidations can impact operational characteris-
tics of the airline’s products. Third, a comprehensive and latest dataset is publicly
available from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). The data used include
Origin and Destination survey, Air Travel Consumer Report, On-Time Performance,
T-100 Domestic Segment, and other sources from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation
Statistics.
To simulate merger effects, I set up a structural model of demand and supply
in differentiated product markets. The demand model uses discrete choice setting
(McFadden, 1981; Berry et al., 1995) and particularly adopts random coefficient logit
model with finite consumer types (Berry et al., 2006; Berry and Jia, 2010) to see
whether the tourists and the business passengers exhibit heterogeneous preferences
for price and characteristics. In the supply model, I set up a two-stage oligopoly
game where firms decide optimal product characteristics - flight frequency, on-time
performance, mishandled baggage rate, and denied boarding rate - at the first stage,
4Since the U.S. airline market was deregulated in 1979, there have been more than thirty
merger cases. They exhibit a variation in merging entity types such as legacy, regional,
low cost carriers (LCCs). The comprehensive list of U.S. airline mergers is available at
http://www.airlines.org/Pages/U.S.-Airline-Mergers-and-Acquisitions.aspx.
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and then choose optimal prices at the second stage. Even though the sequential
choice model involves technical difficulties, it is more realistic for industries where
adjusting product characteristics requires a long time.5
After estimating the model parameters, I predict post-merger equilibrium by
using three different games: traditional model with endogenous price (Price model,
GP ), a new model with endogenous characteristics and endogenous price (Full model,
GFL), and a hypothetical model where firms can choose only prices under pre-merger
situation, and product characteristics are given by post-merger characteristics of
the full model. (Hypothetical model, GH). Since the hypothetical model does not
consider the ownership consolidation, price changes in the game arise from the ad-
justment of characteristics rather than from the cross-price effect. I compare price
changes from the three simulations, and then identify two different cross-price effects,
respectively, from the price model and the full model.
This study examines the Delta and Northwest Airlines merger, which created
the largest commercial airline in the world as of 2008. Importantly, they competed
in more than 450 markets with each other. Based on its greater scale of overlapped
markets than other recent merger cases, we can expect the merger effect to be consid-
erable. Further, the integration process had been completed early enough (December
2009) for the actual post-merger data to be available. This enables an evaluation of
the simulation performance.
From the simulation results, I find that (i) the merged firm tends to increase
product differentiation post-merger. I measure a product quality by taking an inner
product of the set of endogenous characteristics and their respective parameters, and
5For example, Fan (2013) studied the U.S. Daily Newspaper Market by using a sequential choice
model. Endogenous newspaper characteristics include non-advertising space, the number of staff for
opinion sections, the number of reporters, and other measures. All these are not quite changeable
in a short period of time.
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then compute a change in quality of each product. The result shows that the merged
firm raises the quality of primary products, but largely decreases that of secondary
products.6 (ii) The higher product differentiation reduces the firm’s incentive to raise
prices especially of the primary products. On the contrary, the firm increases prices of
the secondary products substantially with intent to move passengers from secondary
to more profitable primary goods. (iii) Consumer and producer welfare changes
substantially differ from those of standard merger analyses. While the price model
predicts decrease in consumer surplus for both types of passengers, the full model
predicts that the business travelers get welfare gains due to the quality improvement
of the primary goods, and this leads to an overall increase in consumer surplus.
Regarding producer surplus, both models show that merged firm earns higher profit
and competitors have less profits, but the additional gain to the merged firm is much
bigger in full model. (iv) Finally, endogenizing characteristics is essential to better
predict the actual outcome. Based on the comparison between the pre-merger, the
simulated, and actual post-merger frequency, I find that the simulated frequency
becomes closer to actual post-merger frequency. In summary, the results highlight
that the analysts need to endogenize product characteristics as well, when simulating
the effects of a proposed merger.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it extends
merger literature. Focusing on airline merger studies, one group of papers adopts
comparative analysis or reduced form model to examine changes in price, output, or
welfare. Borenstein (1990), Werden et al. (1991), Kim and Singal (1993), Morrison
(1996), Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010), and Luo (2011) belong to this group. Another
group takes a more structural approach to simulate post-merger outcomes. Peters
6A primary product refers to a major route where passenger traffic is large, and a secondary
product indicates a route where small number of passengers travel.
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(2006) applies the discrete-choice demand and oligopolistic pricing game and suggests
that merger simulation can better perform when it considers the changes in product
characteristics. But he updates the characteristics by using actual post-merger data
rather than endogenizes them in the model. Richard (2003) endogenizes flight fre-
quency decision as well as quantity decision. However, the model is restricted to a
single-firm optimization so that merged firm’s decision is not affected by competitors,
and the choice variables are decided simultaneously (a one-stage monopoly game).
My research belongs to the latter group, but endogenizes both the set of product
characteristics and prices in a sequential fashion in oligopolistic markets (a two-stage
oligopoly game).
Second, this study contributes to the on-going literature on endogenous product
choice (or quality). Starting from Mazzeo (2002), the issue has been continuously ad-
dressed by Crawford and Shum (2006), Gandhi et al. (2008), Draganska et al. (2009),
Chu (2010), Byrne (2012), and Fan (2013).7 Endogenizing product characteristics
involves serious computational burden, especially when supply model adopts a two-
stage oligopoly game with continuous characteristics. This is because one needs to
compute derivatives of prices with respect to product characteristics for all products
in a market. The literature avoids the complicated matrix by assuming reduced-form
profit function without demand-driven market share (Mazzeo, 2002) or by adopting
a one-stage game (Gandhi et al., 2008; Chu, 2010) or by analyzing monopoly market
(Crawford and Shum, 2006; Byrne, 2012). The closest paper to mine is Fan (2013)
in terms of specifying a two-stage oligopoly game. She derives the matrix by taking
the total derivative of the second-stage optimality condition as an application of the
implicit function theorem. I empirically solve it in a more explicit way in which the
7Crawford (2012) well summarizes this on-going literature. Also, Cho (2012) provides a great
review by categorizing the literature according by types of product differentiation and consumer
heterogeneity.
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optimal price function is derived from the second-stage optimality condition, and
then I differentiate it with respect to product characteristics to solve the first-stage
optimality condition. Since my approach directly computes the derivatives, it can be
applied to more complicated optimization problems where multiple choice variables
are correlated and decided sequentially (e.g. a three-stage oligopoly game).
Finally, looking at the overlap between above two subjects, this paper adds an
empirical evidence on how a merger influences ‘product positioning’ or ‘product va-
riety’. This issue still remains controversial. A series of papers including Berry and
Waldfogel (2001), Gandhi et al. (2008), and Sweeting (2010) shows that merged firm
tends to increase product differentiation to avoid market cannibalization. On the
other hand, Gotz and Gugler (2006) finds that higher concentration in retail gaso-
line market reduces product variety. This matter is critical because the consumer
welfare is largely depending on how products are repositioned post-merger (Mazzeo
et al., 2013). To provide a new evidence from the airline industry, I introduce two
quality-distance measures: within-firm distance and within-market distance and an-
alyze post-merger changes in the extent of product differentiation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the struc-
tural model of air travel market and derives necessary optimality conditions. Section
3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents an estimation procedure and reports model
parameters. Section 5 simulates post-merger product characteristics and price, and
analyzes welfare changes. The comparison analysis between the simulated and ac-
tual post-merger outcome is also addressed here. Section 6 concludes with a brief
summary.
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II.2 The Model
This section presents demand and supply model in the air travel market. In each
market, carriers provide the set of differentiated products, and each consumer either
purchases one product or takes the outside option of not flying. Importantly, the
endogenous product characteristics are assumed to affect both consumers’ utility and
firms’ cost.
II.2.1 Demand
The demand model follows discrete choice framework with heterogeneous consumer
preferences (Berry et al., 1995, henceforth, BLP). In particular, I allow the consumer
heterogeneity to be represented by discrete distribution with only two types of con-
sumers (Berry and Jia, 2010). As Borenstein and Rose (1994), Gerardi and Shapiro
(2009), and several airline studies suggest, we can regard them as the business pas-
sengers and the tourists (r = 1 or 2).
A ‘market’ is a directional round trip between origin and destination city (see
figure 1).8 A ‘product’ is a unique combination of carrier-itinerary.9 In other words,
given an itinerary, all tickets sold by a carrier are aggregated to form a representative
product.10 This market and product definitions allow us to distinguish direct and
connecting flights and to use information on characteristics for each airport.
Each consumer derives utility from price, observed product characteristics, and
unobserved components. The conditional indirect utility of a passenger i who is of
8A city is a Metropolitan Statistical Area. In general, one city has one airport, but a few big
cities have multiple airports. For example, Chicago has ORD (O’Hare) and MDW (Midway) airport
as described in figure 1.
9An itinerary is an ordered sequence of airports for a round-trip.
10The product definition is based on two considerations. First, the data on mishandled baggage
rate and denied boarding rate are available only at carrier-level. Second, if each ticket is considered
as a product, the estimation time tends to seriously increase, mainly because product shares need
to be inverted at each iteration to derive unobserved product quality.
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type r from choosing product j in market t is assumed to be
uijt = pjtαr + yjtψr + zjtϕ+ ξjt + νit(λ) + λijt
= xjtβr + ξjt + νit(λ) + λijt, (1)
where pjt is a passenger-weighted average ticket price of product j. yjt is a two-
dimensional vector including Ontime15 and Layovers. Ontime15 represents on-time
performance of a product. A flight is counted as ‘on-time’ if it arrives at a gate less
than 15 minutes after the scheduled arrival time. Since the original data contain a
flight’s scheduled arrival and actual arrival time on each non-stop segment, I measure
Ontime15 as the geometric mean of percentage of flights that arrive on-time on each
segment. Layovers is the number of connections per round-trip: 0 for direct flights
and 2 for connecting flights.11 I allow pjt and yjt to have random coefficients αr
and ψr, respectively, to see whether the business passengers and the tourists exhibit
heterogeneous tastes for price, on-time arrival, and direct flight.
The vector zjt includes several other characteristics for which both types of
passengers are assumed to have same level of marginal utility (ϕ). It contains
Frequency, the number of average daily departures, to capture the benefits from
convenient flight schedule with multiple departure times. Frequency is computed
as the geometric mean of a flight frequency on each segment for a similar reason to
Ontime15. Mishandled baggage is the number of mishandled baggages per 1,000
passengers. If a passenger’s baggage is lost, damaged, or delayed, it is considered
mishandled. zjt also includes Denied boarding measured by the number of involun-
11In the sample, passengers on direct flights have two coupons with no connection, and passengers
on connecting flights have four coupons with two connections. Technically, ‘direct’ means that
passengers do not change a plane between origin and destination, whereas ‘non-stop’ means that
the flight does not stop between origin and destination. In this paper, I use both terms to refer to
flights that do not stop between origin and destination.
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tary denied boardings per 10,000 passengers. Even though consumers hold confirmed
reservations, they may be denied boarding from a flight due to airline overbooking.
In this research, the four characteristics - Ontime15, Frequency, Mishandled
baggage, and Denied boarding - are modeled as endogenous variables (along with
endogenous price). In previous studies, the characteristics are assumed to be exoge-
nous based on the notion that firms cannot adjust them at least in the short run.
However, this paper aims to simulate the merger effect. Since airline integration pro-
cess takes a long time to be completed and the consolidation influences the overall
operational characteristics of airline products, I reasonably set the characteristics to
be a firm’s choice variables.12
As additional controls, zjt includes HubDM , the number of a carrier’s hub air-
ports on itinerary. This variable controls consumer valuation for frequent flier pro-
gram and convenient gate access generated by a carrier’s hub operation. I also
expect that passengers’ utility depend on Constant, Distance (the total round-trip
distance), Slot − control (the number of slot-controlled airports on itinerary), and
Tour (1 if a destination airport is located in either California, Florida, or Nevada).13
Finally, I include several carrier dummies to control the brand-specific effect. Ma-
jor airlines are Continental (CO), Delta (DL), Northwest (NW ), United (UA), US
Airways (US), and American (AA, the base carrier). Two low cost carriers are
Southwest (WN) and AirTran (FL). The remaining carriers are defined as Other
Carriers (OT ).
ξjt is an unobserved (to the econometrician) product quality which is not captured
by the dataset. It represents ticket- or flight-level characteristics such as Saturday
12The integration process for the Delta and Northwest Airlines merger continued for twenty one
months after the initial announcement in April 2008.
13In this study, slot-controlled airports include Chicago O’Hare (ORD), John F. Kennedy (JFK),
LaGuardia (LGA), Reagan National (DCA) airport.
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night stay-over, advance purchase, non-refundability, minimum or maximum stay re-
striction, and in-flight meal service quality.14 νit is the nested logit disturbance. It is
constant across all airline products (inside goods) in market t, but differentiates air
travels from the outside option of not flying. λ is the nested logit parameter which
represents the degree of product differentiation between inside goods. It varies be-
tween 0 and 1. If λ = 1 (then νit = 0), each airline product is perfectly differentiated.
In this case, there will be no need to set outside option, and demand specification
becomes a multinomial logit model. If λ = 0, all airline services are perfectly substi-
tutable. ijt is an i.i.d. (across consumers, products, and markets) logit error. The
error structure νit(λ) + λijt follows the Type I extreme value distribution to derive
closed-form market share equation.
The indirect utility from the outside good (e.g. driving a car or taking a train)
is given by
ui0t = ξ0t + i0t. (2)
A simple way to identify mean utility of the outside good is setting it as one of the
inside goods. However, it is not desirable strategy because airline products are quite
different services from those by other ground transportation modes. Alternatively, I
normalize both ξ0t and i0t to be zero for all consumers. In this case, the coefficient
of Constant will measure marginal utility from choosing any airline products.
Note that in the standard BLP model, consumer tastes vary with demographics
and unobserved individual characteristics, following multivariate normal (or other
continuous) distributions. Differently, the random coefficients here vary with finite
passenger types, following discrete r-type distribution. Thus, I derive a market share
14This restricted information is available only in transaction-level data from Computer Reserva-
tion System. An analysis which uses the specific information can be found in Puller et al. (2012).
15
function by computing the weighted sum of the market share for each type, rather
than by integrating purchase probability over continuous distributions. The weight
is the percentage of type r consumers in the population (γr).
Assuming each type r consumer purchases one airline ticket which gives the high-
est mean utility (xjtβr + ξjt), the market share of jth product is given by
sjt(xt, ξt, θd) =
2∑
r=1
γr · e
(xjtβr+ξjt)/λ∑
k∈Jt e
(xktβr+ξkt)/λ
· (
∑
k∈Jt e
(xktβr+ξkt)/λ)λ
1 + (
∑
k∈Jt e
(xktβr+ξkt)/λ)
λ
, (3)
where xt = (x1t, . . . , xJt), ξt = (ξ1t, . . . , ξJt), and Jt is the set of all airline products
in market t. θd is the set of all demand parameters (αr, ψr, ϕ, λ, γr). Each market
provides two groups of products: all the airline services and outside option, thus
the first term indicates within-group share of airline product j, and the second term
denotes to group share of all the airline products.
II.2.2 Supply
In this section, I describe a two-stage oligopoly game where each carrier chooses
optimal product characteristics first and then decides optimal prices to maximize
the expected profit under Bertrand-Nash competition. Airline network structures
such as markets, routes, airports served, and location of hub airports are assumed
to be exogenous.15
At the first stage, firm f decides the set of product characteristics, x¯j=(x¯
O
j , x¯
F
j ,
15This assumption is justified by the fact that most airlines sign ‘long-term use-and-lease agree-
ments’ with airports to occupy the airport facilities. The detailed information on the contractual
practices between airports and airlines can be found in Ciliberto and Williams (2010) and Lee
(2013). Also, considering that an airline product is a carrier-route combination, the assumption is
analogous to a typical setting where the number of products offered is exogenously given.
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x¯Mj , x¯
D
j ) to maximize the profit function
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ΠIf =
∑
j∈Jf
(pj(x¯)−mcj(x¯Fj )) ·M · sj(p(x¯), x¯, ξ; θd)− F (x¯f , ζf ; τ) (4)
where x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯J), x¯f = (x¯1f , . . . , x¯Jf ), and ζf = (ζ1f , . . . , ζJf ). J is the set of all
products in a market, and Jf is the set of all products offered by firm f in a market.
Throughout the supply model, a market subscript t is omitted for simplicity.17 mcj
is the marginal cost of product j, and M is a market size which is the geometric
mean of the MSA population of two end-point cities. sj(·) is the demand-driven
market share function of product j coming from equation (3), and F (·) is the fixed
cost function.
In equation (4), a carrier’s decision on the characteristics (x¯) affects prices,
marginal, and fixed cost. It also affects market share directly and indirectly.18 To be
specific, in each market, prices of all products are influenced by the characteristics
of all products through pj(x¯) and p(x¯). These interactions (arising from a two-stage
oligopoly game) make the necessary equilibrium conditions difficult to be computed.
The way of solving it is described in section 2.3.
Marginal cost of serving an additional passenger is given by the following linear
function
mcj = hjδ + ωj (5)
where hj denotes the set of cost characteristics. hj includes Frequency (x¯
F
j ) to
16The superscript O, F , M , and D denote the first letter of the endogenous product character-
istics, respectively.
17Following Berry and Jia (2010), markets are assumed to be independent. Thus, all equations
in this section are applied to each market without loss of generality.
18Even though price, marginal cost, and market share function also depend on other control
variables, equation (4) is expressed with a focus on the endogenous characteristics.
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capture marginal cost effect of the aircraft utilization. Among the four endogenous
characteristics, only Frequency is modeled to affect marginal cost because it is a
quantity-related variable. hj also controls HubMC, 1 if a flight departs from, con-
nects at, or arrives at its hub airport. A carrier’s hub operation can cause two
countervailing effects on marginal cost. In hub-and-spoke system, a majority of pas-
sengers come from different origins and connect at a carrier’s hub airport to reach
their final destinations. This allows the carrier to generate high load factor on major
routes, which contributes to decreasing the per-passenger cost. On the other hand, a
carrier’s hub operation causes massive air- and ground-side congestion at an airport.
This can increase marginal cost. The coefficient reflects the net effect of the two fac-
tors. I control two distance measures, Distanceshort and Distancelong, considering
that fuel efficiency can differ depending on aircraft size, and different sizes of fleets are
allocated on short-haul and long-haul routes.19 Similarly, I control Layoversshort and
Layoverslong. Connecting flights involve an additional landing/takeoff during which
airplanes burn a large fraction of fuel, and the amount of fuel consumed is known
to vary with aircraft size.20 Finally, I set carrier dummies to control carrier-specific
cost effect.
δ indicates a vector of cost parameters, and ωj represents unobservable (to the
econometrician) marginal cost shocks. It includes fluctuations in oil prices, quality
of on-board meals, charges levied for landing, and other unobserved factors.
Following Fan (2013), I adopt a quadratic function to approximate the fixed cost
function. Specifically, the slope of the fixed cost with respect to an endogenous
19I create an indicator variable Ilong=1 if a market distance is longer than 3,500 miles and
Ishort=1 if a market distance is shorter than 3,500 miles. Then the distance measures are computed
as Distancelong = Distance ∗ Ilong and Distanceshort = Distance ∗ Ishort.
20Similar to the distance measures, I compute the two Layovers as Layoverslong = Layover∗Ilong
and Layovershort = Layover ∗ Ishort.
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characteristic (x¯kj , k = O,F,M,D) is given by
∂F (x¯f , ζf ; τ)
∂x¯kj
= τ k0 + τ
k
1 x¯
k
j + ζ
k
j , (6)
where τ is a vector of parameters, and ζkj represents unobservable fixed-cost shock.
Adjustments of the operational characteristics accompany consolidation of facilities
(aircraft, gate, and ticket counter) and workforce (pilots, flight crew, gate/ticket
takers, baggage handlers, and ticket booking agent). Using more or less of these
resources influences the fixed cost. Other cost shocks such as advertising costs are
captured by ζkj .
Given a vector x¯j chosen at the first stage, firm f decides price pj at the second
stage to maximize the following profit function,
ΠIIf =
∑
j∈Jf
ΠIIj =
∑
j∈Jf
(pj −mcj) ·M · sj(p, x¯, ξ; θd). (7)
While the first stage profit function is specified as the difference between the vari-
able profit and the fixed cost, carriers now maximize the variable profit under the
Bertrand-Nash competition.
In airline industry, prices are easily changeable, but the product characteristics
are not. For example, when a carrier increases flight frequency, it needs to adjust
aircraft size and to hire more employees who manage flight schedule. Further, it may
reallocate gates based on contract with airport authority. However, price decisions
can be made relatively quickly and flexibly at the final stage. Hence, this sequential
choice model better reflects airlines’ decision-making process.
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II.2.3 Necessary Equilibrium Conditions
I solve carriers’ optimization problems by deriving necessary equilibrium conditions
for the product characteristics and prices. From the conditions, I will recover the
structural errors in marginal cost function (ωj) and fixed cost function (ζ
O
j , ζ
F
j , ζ
M
j ,
ζDj ) in section 4.
Starting with the second-stage game based on backward induction, I take the
derivative of the second-stage profit function ΠIIf with respect to prices (pj, j =
1, . . . , Jf ) to generates the first-order condition ∂Π
II
f /∂pj,
sj(p, x¯, ξ; θd) +
∑
h∈Jf
(ph −mch) · ∂sh(p, x¯, ξ; θd)
∂pj
= 0. (8)
Stacking all Jf products together yields
sf (p, x¯, ξ; θd) + Ωsf ,pf · (pf −mcf ) = 0, (9)
where sf = [s1, . . . , sJf ]
′, pf = [p1, . . . , pJf ]
′, mcf = [mc1, . . . ,mcJf ]
′, and Ωsf ,pf is a
Jf × Jf matrix given by
Ωsf ,pf =

∂s1
∂p1
· · · ∂sJf
∂p1
...
. . .
...
∂s1
∂pJf
· · · ∂sJf
∂pJf
 . (10)
Rearranging terms in equation (9) derives a carrier’s optimal price function,
pf = hfδ + ωf − Ω−1sf ,pf · sf (p, x¯, ξ; θd). (11)
The right hand side be composed of two parts. The first two terms indicate the
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marginal cost and the remaining term (including negative sign) constitutes markup.
Through the two components, the optimal price is affected by product characteristics.
This dependency provides a link between the first stage and the second stage game.
Moving on to the first-stage game, I differentiate the profit function ΠIf with
respect to the product characteristics (x¯kj , j = 1, . . . , Jf , k = O,F,M,D) to yield
the first-order condition ∂ΠIf/∂x¯
k
j ,
∑
h∈Jf
∂ΠIIh
∂x¯kj
+
∑
h∈Jf
∑
h′∈J
∂ΠIIh
∂ph′
∂ph′
∂x¯kj
− τ k0 − τ k1 x¯kj − ζkj = 0. (12)
While the adjustment of x¯kj has a direct effect on variable profit of product h (Π
II
h ),
it also has an indirect impact on ΠIIh by affecting prices of all products in a market.
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Main computational difficulty arises from
∂ph′
∂x¯kj
in the second term. This requires the
derivative of all equilibrium prices with respect to all products’ characteristics.22 As
a great way of computing it, Fan (2013) applies the implicit function theorem by
taking the total derivative of the second-stage optimality condition (9) with respect
to prices and product characteristics.23 Since this approach relies on the observed
product characteristics, one needs to rule out corner solutions where the equation
(9) does not hold. I empirically solve it in a more explicit way. I plug the optimal
price function (11) into the first-stage profit function (4) and differentiate the profit
function with respect to each product characteristic. While both methods need an
21For Frequency (x¯Fj ), the exact expression for the first-order condition is equation (13) below,
because the frequency affects marginal cost function. However, the optimal price function includes
marginal cost in it, thus equation (12) and (13) are essentially same for Frequency.
∑
h∈Jf
∂ΠIIh
∂x¯Fj
+
∑
h∈Jf
∑
h′∈J
∂ΠIIh
∂ph′
∂ph′
∂x¯Fj
−
∑
h∈Jf
∂ΠIIh
∂mch
∂mch
∂x¯Fj
− τF0 − τF1 x¯Fj − ζFj = 0 (13)
22Technically, the derivative requires us to compute
∂(Ω−1sf ,pf )
∂x¯kf
and
∂(Ω−1sJ ,pJ )
∂x¯kJ
.
23This approach was initially introduced by Villas-Boas (2007).
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assumption that the optimal price function is smooth and differentiable with respect
to the characteristics, they produce the same computational result for a two-stage
oligopoly game.24 However, since my approach directly computes the derivatives,
it can be applied to more complicated optimization problems where multiple choice
variables are correlated and decided sequentially (e.g. a three-stage oligopoly game).
II.3 Data
II.3.1 Sources
I collected the data from a variety of sources (see table 1). The primary data set is
the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) produced by the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT).25 Based on the DB1B, I defined the market and product,
and created the variables varying by product (Fare and Layovers), carrier (brand
dummies), airport (Slot−control), carrier/airport (HubDM , HubMC), and market
(Distance and Tour).
The endogenous product characteristics come from three different sources, also
produced by the DOT. I calculated Ontime15 based on the Airline On-Time Per-
formance Data. The data contain monthly information on scheduled and actual
departure/arrival times for a flight, covering all U.S. carriers that account for at
least one percent of domestic scheduled passenger revenues.26 Frequency was con-
structed by using T-100 Domestic Segment Data. Among several departure-related
terms, I used ‘departures performed’ which counts takeoffs by each carrier at an
24The four endogenous product characteristics in this research are reasonably continuous.
25The DB1B database is a 10% sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers, produced on a
quarterly basis. There are three subcomponents to the DB1B: market, coupon, and ticket dataset.
This study combines the last two dataset.
26With this data, one can create other discrete variables (e.g. Ontime30, Ontime60) or continuous
variables (e.g. Average minutes late). Besides departure and arrival times, the data also provide
information on the causes of delay and cancelations.
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airport. Finally, I used Air Travel Consumer Report to create Mishandled baggage
and Denied boarding. While the report is filed on a monthly basis, the statistics on
Mishandled baggage and Denied boarding are updated by monthly and quarterly,
respectively. Hence, I computed Mishandled baggage as the average value of the
mishandled baggage rate of each month during a quarter.
Further, I used airline employment data and weather data to construct instru-
mental variables for the endogenous characteristics. The employment data come from
Air Carrier Financial Reports (Schedule P-10). It contains annual employee statis-
tics by labor category such as pilots/copilots, maintenance employees, and passenger
handling employees. The weather data was collected from Weather Underground.
This is a commercial weather service which gathers its most information from the
National Weather Service (NWS). Typically, the weather reporting location for a
particular city is its airport, which is appropriate for this research. The instruments
will be explained in more detail in Section 4.
II.3.2 Sample Selection and Description
The Delta and Northwest Airlines merger was announced the second quarter of 2008.
I define pre-merger period as the four quarters pre-dating the announcement. Hence,
the sample period for estimating pre-merger demand and supply is from the second
quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2008.
The criteria for sample selection is as follows. In ticket level, I focus on round-
trip itineraries within U.S. continent with at most four coupons. Also, I drop tickets
whose prices are lower than $50 or higher than $1,800. The lower bound is to elimi-
nate tickets purchased using frequent flyer miles, and the higher bound is to restrict
the sample to coach-class travel. In product level, I drop observations with fewer
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than five passengers because they are likely to be non-regular services.27 I exclude
products associated with open-jaw.28 An open-jaw trip does not fit for applying the
typical definitions of origin and destination city. Further, they are known to be sub-
ject to different pricing scheme relative to the ordinary round-trip tickets. In market
level, I focus on medium to large metropolitan areas whose populations are more
than 850,000. This is for reducing heterogeneity of demand and supply. As Berry
and Jia (2010) states, the demand pattern and the operation cost among small-sized
markets tend to be different from those among medium to large-sized markets.
The final sample contains 87,906 unique products in 9,117 markets.29 Table 2
provides summary statistics for the estimation sample. Focusing on the endogenous
characteristics, the mean value of Ontime15 indicates 75% of flights arrived on-
time during the sample period. As extreme cases, 24 products have 100% on-time
performance record. All of them are direct flights, and more than half of them
are produced by the Southwest Airlines. As the worst cases, 160 products have
0% on-time performance. When using a rougher measure Ontime30, the on-time
performance increases to 86%. Also, a continuous measure Average minutes late
shows that flights arrived 12.6 minutes late on average. The statistics for Frequency
indicate that flights departed 4.3 times a day on average. It varies significantly across
markets and products. To be specific, frequency is higher in tourism markets (4.52)
than in others (4.23), and higher in short-haul markets (4.41) than in long-haul
markets (4.20). Further, flights originating from a carrier’s hub airports show high
frequency (4.91) than others (4.27). Lastly, the number of mishandled baggages are
27Since the DB1B is a 10% random sample, those airline products are likely to carry less than
fifty passengers during a quarter.
28An open-jaw trip is essentially a round trip in which the outward point of departure and the
inward point of arrival are not the same.
29Travels on same itinerary but in different quarters are considered as different products in
different markets.
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6.4 per 1,000 passengers, and the number of denied boardings are 1.2 per 10,000
passengers. They also exhibit large variations across carriers and across quarters for
each carrier.
II.4 Estimation
To estimate the model parameters, I recover the structural errors in the demand and
supply specification as a function of model parameters and data. The errors include
unobserved quality (ξt), marginal cost shock (ωt), and fixed cost shocks (ζ
O
t , ζ
F
t , ζ
M
t ,
ζDt ). ξt is derived by inverting the market share function: ξt = s
−1(xt, s˙t, θd). Given
demand parameters θd=[αr, ψr, ϕ, λ, γr] and data xt, I solve for ξjt that equates the
predicted market share to observed market share by using a contraction mapping
(Berry et al., 1995; Berry and Jia, 2010),
ξHjt = ξ
H−1
jt + λ[ln ˙sjt − ln sjt(xt, ξt, θd)], (14)
where H denotes the H th iteration, ˙sjt is the observed market share, and sjt(xt, ξt, θd)
is the predicted market share defined by equation (3). This convergence process is
carried out market by market because market share of product j depends on the
characteristics of all products in market t.30
The marginal cost shock is recovered by necessary optimality conditions at the
second stage. From the optimal price function (11), I derive ωjt as a function of
marginal cost characteristics hjt and parameters δ,
ωjt = pjt − hjtδ + Ω−1sft,pft · sjt(pt, x¯t, ξt; θd). (15)
30I iterate the contraction mapping until the maximum difference between each iteration is smaller
than 10−12: ‖ξM − ξM−1‖∞ = max{|ξM1 − ξM−11 |, · · · , |ξMJt − ξM−1Jt |} < 10−12.
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Finally, the fixed cost shock for each endogenous characteristic is obtained by
the optimality condition at the first stage. The first-order condition (12) yields ζkjt
(k = O,F,M,D) as,
ζkjt =
∑
h∈Jft
∂ΠIIh
∂x¯kjt
+
∑
h∈Jft
∑
h′∈Jt
∂ΠIIh
∂ph′
∂ph′
∂x¯kjt
− τ k0 − τ k1 x¯kjt. (16)
The marginal and fixed cost shocks are computed carrier by carrier within a market,
considering that each firm maximizes profit from its own products. Notice that de-
mand parameters θd enters the specifications of all structural errors. While θd enters
the unobservable quality ξjt on the demand side, it becomes a factor of marginal cost
shock ωjt through the market share function, and of ζ
k
jt (k = O,F,M,D) through
the profit function. Moreover, marginal cost parameters δ included in ωjt enters ζkjt
through the profit function. This interrelation motivates us to jointly estimate the
demand and supply parameters for enhancing efficiency.
I estimate the parameters by using the two-stage nonlinear Generalized Method
of Moments. For product j in market t, let Wjt=[W
d
jt W
c
jt W
k
jt] be a set of instruments
for endogenous variables in demand, marginal cost, and fixed cost specification, re-
spectively. As an identification assumption, I set the moment conditions by taking
expectations of each structural error interacted with the exogenous instruments
∀j, t :
E[W d′jt ξjt(θd)] = 0,
E[W c′jtωjt(θd, δ)] = 0, (17)
E[W k′jt ζ
k
jt(θd, δ, τ
k)] = 0, k = O,F,M,D.
Let g(Θ) be the stacked vector of sample analogues to the moments (17), where
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Θ = [θd δ τ
k]. I minimize the first-stage objective function Q = g(Θ)′V g(Θ) with
a weighting matrix V = (W ′W )−1, assuming all error terms are homoscedastic. After
obtaining parameter estimates Θ̂1, I compute the structural errors ηˆ = [ξˆ ωˆ ζˆk]
to obtain the optimal weighting matrix V = (W ′ηˆηˆ′W )−1 for second stage. The
objective function is minimized once again to produce the final parameter estimates
Θ̂2.
II.4.1 Instruments
Carriers observe the product quality ξjt and the cost shocks (ωjt, ζ
k
jt, k = O,F,M,D)
before they decide optimal product characteristics and prices. Therefore, the carri-
ers’ decisions are correlated with the structural errors. As an example of price, airline
tickets restricted to Saturday night stay-over, advance purchase, or non-refundability
requirement tend to be cheaper than unrestricted tickets (Puller et al., 2012). Fur-
ther, when carrier face significant marginal cost shocks (e.g. fuel cost, landing fee)
and fixed cost shocks (e.g. insurance, FAA registration fee, advertising cost), they
may reorganize flight operations and production facilities which can affect the prod-
uct characteristics. In this sense, the price and the characteristics are endogenous.
The exogenous instruments for prices include the information on market and
airport-carrier level. The number of routes within a market can represents the degree
of the market competition, which is correlated with overall price level. Next, the
number of cities directly connected from an origin airport by a carrier measures
the carrier’s network size from each airport. This airport-carrier specific variable
is related to the attractiveness of frequent flier program and thus can capture a
substantial portion of price premium. Finally, exogenous variables in the demand
and supply specification are included.
The identification strategy for the product characteristics is to find exogenous
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factors influencing airline operations. I apply weather conditions at an airport, a
carrier’s hub status at an airport, and a carrier’s employment statistics (see table 3).
First, weather conditions such as wind, rain, and snowfall are beyond carriers’ con-
trols, but affect several product characteristics either directly or indirectly. Ontime15
is affected most. Adverse weather conditions are the direct cause of most flight delays
because it requires extra preparations for takeoff and landing. Mishandled baggage
also falls under the direct effect since a delayed baggage is counted as a mishandled
one.31 The bad weather indirectly influences Frequency through flight cancelations.
Since I measured Frequency based on departures performed (not on departures
scheduled), the cancelation due to bad weather is correlated with Frequency. How-
ever, it is not easy to find a close relationship between the weather conditions and
Denied boarding. Notably, when the U.S. DOT measure Denied boarding, it does
not consider passengers affected by canceled, delayed, or diverted flights.
Second, a carrier’s hub status at an airport, which can be treated as exogenous,
significantly affects the product characteristics.32 As Rupp et al. (2006) states, flights
originating from hub airports tend to have lower on-time performance, because some
of aircraft services such as cleaning, refueling, or catering occur only at hub airports,
requiring a longer preparation time for the next same-day departure. Differently,
flights connecting to hub airports tend to have better on-time performance in order
to reduce inconvenience to connecting passengers. About Frequency, flights to and
out of hub airports tend to exhibit high frequency to accommodate the dense traffic
31Wyld et al. (2005) provides a good example. During Christmas holiday season in 2004 when se-
vere weather created disruptions, US Airways misplaced thousands of baggages across the Midwest,
accumulating them at airports along the East Coast.
32The exogeneity assumption on a carrier’s hub status at an airport is supported by DOT (1999).
In most medium and large airports in the US, major airlines have entered into long term use-and-
lease agreements, including residual, compensatory, and hybrid agreements to attain the status
of hub (or signatory) carrier. The average length of the agreement was 28 years for a residual
agreement, 17 years for a compensatory agreement, and 20 years for a hybrid agreement.
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flows (Brueckner and Zhang, 2001). Since my sample is supporting the pattern, I
include all hub-related variables in instruments. Baggages are mostly mishandled
when transferred through hub airports during congested peak periods (Jayaraman
and O’Connell, 2011). Hence, I consider only connection at a hub as an instrument
for Mishandled baggage. Since Denied boarding is positively correlated with high
load factor mostly observed from flights out of hubs, the origination from a hub is
included.
The final group of instruments contains a carrier’s employment statistics. Using
Air Carrier Financial Report, I calculated the percentage of workers in each labor
category over total number of employees in an airline company and identified how
their works were related to each product characteristic. Suppose that significant
malfunctions of aircraft systems are detected just before departure time, then many
skilled maintenance workers would be necessary for the flight to be on-time. Simi-
larly, carriers need a large number of pilots, copilots, and aircraft controllers to keep
high Frequency. Mishandled baggage and Denied boarding can be affected by the
number of cargo handling employees and the number of staff in statistical posts,
respectively.
I conduct F-test by running reduced-form regressions. The test statistics (in
bottom panel of table 3) indicate that the instruments are valid at 99% significance
level.
II.4.2 Estimation Results
II.4.2.1 Demand parameters
The first column in table 4 reports the estimated demand parameters. First, price
parameters are identified by sensitiveness of product shares in response to changes
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in prices. The coefficients of Fare1 and Fare2 are -0.098 and -0.999, respectively.
While both groups receive disutility from price increase, type 2 passengers exhibit
about ten times as much price sensitivity as type 1 passengers. Based on industry
knowledge, we can regard type 1 as the business travelers and type 2 as the tourists.33
Positive coefficients of Ontime151 and Ontime152 suggest that better on-time
performance increases passengers utility who do not want flight delay during their
travels. It should be noted that consumers do not know whether they would experi-
ence flight delays or not at the time of ticket purchase. However, as Suzuki (2000)
and Mazzeo (2003) state, passengers can form expectations of flight delays based on
the carrier’s past on-time performances on a specific route. In that sense, the param-
eters can be interpreted as marginal utility from the expected on-time arrival.34 To
calculate willingness-to-pay (WTP) for on-time performance, I divide the coefficients
of Ontime151 and Ontime152 by those of Fare1 and Fare2, respectively. The result
implies that business travelers show nearly eight times higher WTP than the tourists
do: ψ11
α1
/ψ12
α2
= 7.9.
Next, an increase in Frequency has a positive effect on consumers’ utility. The
parameter estimate is 0.084. Consumers value a flight schedule with multiple de-
partures because they are more able to depart at their preferred time. Increases in
Mishandled baggage and Denied boarding will decrease the quality of airline prod-
ucts hurting passengers satisfaction. Reasonably, both characteristics have negative
coefficients: -0.054 for Mishandled baggage and -0.253 for Denied boarding.35
33In Berry and Jia (2010), estimates of price coefficients are -0.07 and -0.78 for the business
passengers and the tourists, respectively (using 1999 data). Berry et al. (2006) reported 0.068 and
0.696 for the business passengers and the tourists, respectively (using 1985 data). My estimates are
close to them in terms of coefficient of each type and difference between the two coefficients.
34More specifically, one can set up a dynamic model where a consumer’s decision at time t depends
on past experiences of flight delays at time t − 1, . . . , t − N . One good reference is Suzuki (2000)
who developed an aggregate-level Markovian type model.
35Similar to on-time performance, I posit that consumers form their expectations on whether the
baggages will be damaged, lost, or delayed, and wether they will be denied boarding from flights
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All other demand parameters have the expected signs. The coefficients of Layovers1
and Layovers2 are -1.255 and -1.085, respectively, indicating that connecting flights
generate disutility to both groups. Going through an additional stopover at the
connecting airport makes their travels not as smooth as flying on direct flights. In
terms of WTP, the business group exhibits about twelve times higher WTP than
the tourists do: ψ21
α1
/ψ22
α2
= 11.8. Distance has a significantly positive coefficient,
0.105. In short-haul markets, airline products are competing with other transporta-
tion modes such as cars, buses, or trains. As a traveling distance increases, however,
the substitutability to the outside goods becomes worse so that demand for air travel
can grow.36 HubDM also has a positive coefficient, 0.056. It indicates that carriers
attract more passengers at their hub airports. Borenstein (1989) called this phe-
nomenon airport dominance by major carriers. The positive parameter is consistent
with the finding.37 The coefficient of Slot − control is -0.071, indicating that pas-
sengers get disutility from traveling through slot-controlled airports. An obvious
source is flight delays frequently observed at these airports. However, since this
study controls the delays by Ontime15, I interpret the disutility to mean fatigue and
discomfort passengers endure at the congested airports. It can include a longer wait-
ing time at ticket check-in counter and security check gates. The positive coefficient
of Tour supports the well-known fact that tourist places attract more passengers.
The nested logit parameter λ measures the degree of product differentiation be-
based on past experiences.
36Many studies controlled distance squared to capture the curvature of demand. For example,
Berry and Jia (2010) found negative sign of distance squared, implying that further increase in
distance makes the travel less pleasant.
37Borenstein (1989) pointed out the airport dominance as the main cause of hub premium. A
body of related studies suggest that the airport dominance is possible because of more convenient
gate access and higher expected value from frequent flier program at hub airport. Recently, Lee
(2013) suggests that the airport dominance is based on the gate contract between airport and major
carriers. The estimates of a structural model reveal that a major carrier’s gate dominance at its
hub airport has a positive effect on consumers’ utility.
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tween all airline products. If λ is equal to 1, air transportation services are perfectly
differentiated. The estimate 0.618 implies that there exists a mild substitution possi-
bility among airline services. Finally, γ1 measures the percentage of type 1 passengers
in the population. The parameter 0.052 indicates that the business group accounts
for only 5.2% of the potential travelers. However, the business passengers are much
more likely to actually buy ticket compared to the price-sensitive tourists. Based on
the consideration, I calculate the percentage of each type of consumers in the sample
and find that the business group makes up 40.5% of the actual travelers.38
II.4.2.2 Marginal and fixed cost parameters
The second column in table 4 presents the cost parameters. Marginal cost parameters
are estimated by regressing the difference between price and estimated markup on
the marginal cost characteristics. Starting with Frequency, the parameter -0.021
indicates that when a carrier adds one more departure per day for a specific route, the
cost of serving an additional passenger tends to decrease by $2.1. Greater Frequency
contributes to increasing aircraft utilization (block hours per day) and to reducing
turnaround times at airports. This makes per-flight and per-passenger cost decrease.
The parameter of HubMC (-0.184) indicates that the existence of hub airport on an
itinerary tends to decrease marginal cost by $18.4. Among two countervailing effects
(described in section 2.2), the negative sign supports that cost reduction from high
load factor is greater.
As expected, Layoversshort and Layoverslong have positive coefficients, 0.175 and
0.300, respectively. The additional fuel that a connecting flight spends during extra
38The estimates are close to those in Berry et al. (2006). Based on various specifications, they
reported that the business travelers make up 2.5%-7.7% in the population, and 26.8%-39.9% in
the sample. I calculate the percentage of the business group in the sample as:
∑T
t=1Mt · γ̂1 ·
Dλ1t
1+Dλ1t
/
∑T
t=1
∑2
r=1Mt · γ̂r · D
λ
rt
1+Dλrt
, where Drt =
∑
k∈Jt e
(xktβ̂r+ξ̂kt)/λ̂.
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landing/takeoff increases marginal cost substantially. Distanceshort and Distancelong
also have positive coefficients, 0.226 and 0.130, respectively. As a market distance
increases, the cost of carrying one more passenger rises. Interestingly, given the
tendency of larger airplanes to serve long-haul markets, the Layovers and Distance
coefficients imply that larger aircrafts tend to consume relatively more fuel during
landing and takeoff phases, but tend to exhibit high fuel efficiency in the air.
The coefficients of carrier dummy variables show that American Airlines (omitted
as a base carrier) appears to have the highest marginal cost, followed by US Airways,
Delta, and Northwest in order of high cost. In order to check the validity of the
carrier-specific cost effect, I looked into each carrier’s operating cost per available
seat mile (CASM) during the sample periods, using Air Carrier Financial Statistics
(Schedule P-12). Table 5 and figure 2 indicate that the order of US Airways-Delta-
Northwest still stands in CASM data. However, American Airlines reports the lowest
CASM, which seems curious. This implies that there can exist other factors which
are not captured by the model.39 The low cost carriers Southwest and AirTran have
reasonably low level of marginal costs than the legacy carriers.
The fixed cost parameters are estimated by regressing the derivative of the vari-
able profit function on the fixed cost characteristics. Notice that the dependent
variable is equivalent to the slope of fixed cost by equation (6) and (12), and thus
the constant terms measure the marginal effect of the characteristics on the fixed
cost. The coefficient of Ontime15constant indicates that as on-time performance im-
proves from 0% to 100%, the fixed cost increases by $0.24 million. Although the
on-time performance is largely affected by exogenous factors such as weather, carri-
39One interesting point in figure 2 is that all carriers experienced substantial increases in CASM
from the fourth quarter of 2007. This is mainly due to high fuel prices during the U.S. economic
recession (beginning December 2007). Specifically, Schedule P-12 data reveal that legacy and LCC
carriers, respectively, spent 23.0% and 27.3% of their operating costs for fuel in 2006, however, the
proportions increased up to 30.2% and 34.7% by 2008.
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ers can still take steps to improve it. They can make an investment to adopt newer
aircraft with fewer maintenance problems, more efficient fuel/food delivery system,
advanced crew scheduling, and better boarding procedures. All these steps increase
the fixed cost significantly.
Frequencyconstant also has positive coefficient 6.605. Although raising Frequency
reduces marginal cost, it increases the fixed cost. Considering that increased fre-
quency on a certain route requires more economic resources such as fleets, pilots and
crew-member, ground-side services, the result makes sense.
Coefficients of Mishandled baggageconstant and Denied boardingconstant are -8.126
and -31.634, respectively. They suggest that as each of them decreases, the fixed
cost increases. Since decreases in the characteristics make airline products better,
the negative signs make intuitive sense. In order for baggages to be in the right place
at the right time, efficient equipment and well-trained agents (e.g. check-in agents,
ramp agents, and baggage handlers) are necessary at each baggage-handling point.
Similarly, reducing the number of involuntarily bumping passengers (without hurting
the load factor) needs to apply sophisticated forecasting system and to increase the
aircraft capacity to some extent. All these improvements lead to higher fixed cost.
II.5 Merger Simulations
The primary purpose of this paper is to simulate how a merged carrier adjusts the
product characteristics and prices, and how the post-merger equilibrium affects wel-
fare. In this section, I simulate the Delta and Northwest Airlines merger based on
pre-merger data, the structural model, and the parameter estimates. Section 5.1
describes simulation methodology, and section 5.2 provides the detailed simulation
results. In section 5.3, I report changes in consumer and producer welfare. Finally,
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section 5.4 evaluates the simulation result by comparing it with actual post-merger
data.
II.5.1 Simulation Methodology
I perform the simulation based on the last two quarters in the pre-merger sample,40
and focus on the markets where the Delta and Northwest Airlines competed with each
other.41 Table 6 describes several statistics for the simulation sample. The merging
airlines competed in 1,129 overlapped markets, including nine duopoly markets prior
to the merger. They had very similar passenger share per market, but their products
were significantly different in terms of the price and the characteristics.
Figure 3 illustrates three separate games: price model GP , full model GFL, and
hypothetical model GH . Pre is actual pre-merger data where P Pre is a price, and
XPre is a vector of the endogenous characteristics. In the price model, carriers can
change only prices post-merger, holding the characteristics fixed at pre-merger level.
This game corresponds to the standard merger simulation where change in price
P P − P Pre measures the cross-price effect CPEP from the merger. On the other
hand, the full model allows carriers to adjust both prices and the characteristics. In
this case, P FL − P Pre represents not only the cross-price effect CPEFL but also de-
mand and cost-driven effects ∆P from ∆X (explained in section 1). I decompose the
price change in the full model into two separate effects by simulating the hypothet-
ical model. This game assumes pre-merger situation as if the Delta and Northwest
40At an early stage of this study, I simulated based on the last quarter in the pre-merger sample
as most merger studies did. The results from that sample are largely consistent with what will
be reported in section 5.2. However, since the last quarter has only three monopoly markets after
ownership consolidation, I expand the simulation sample to provide more robust results not only
for oligopoly markets but for monopoly markets.
41The focus on overlapped markets does not necessarily mean that merger effect in other markets
is negligible. A series of papers studied the spill-over effect over non-overlapped markets. However,
standard merger simulation has focused on the overlapped markets where merger effect arises from
a loss of competition. To compare it with my simulation, I also concentrate those markets.
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Airlines are separate carriers, but the characteristics are hypothetically equated to
the post-merger characteristics in full model XFL. Since this game does not consider
the ownership consolidation, the price change comes from the adjustment of char-
acteristics, that is, PH − P Pre measures ∆P from ∆X. Consequently, P FL − PH
identifies CPEFL.42 Notice that magnitudes of two cross-price effects will be different
because the product repositioning in the full model can cause higher differentiation
or higher substitutability between the merged firm’s products. In the case of higher
differentiation, we expect CPEP > CPEFL, otherwise CPEFL > CPEP .
The full model derives post-merger characteristics and prices sequentially. Based
on the post-merger ownership of the products, the simulation searchesXFLf =(x¯
k∗
f , k =
O,F,M,D) for firm f by solving
XFLf = arg min
∑
k
∂ΠIf
∂x¯kf
′
∂ΠIf
∂x¯kf
, k = O,F,M,D (18)
where
∂ΠIf
∂x¯kf
is the necessary optimality condition (12) at the first-stage game. After
deriving XFL for all carriers in all markets, it continues to derive P FLf by solving the
optimal price function
P FLf = m̂c
∗
f − Ωpostsf ,pf (P FL, XFL, ξˆ; θˆd)−1 · sf (P FL, XFL, ξˆ; θˆd) (19)
where m̂c∗f is marginal cost estimates calculated by using post-merger characteris-
tics XFLf , and Ω
post
sf ,pf
is an analogous matrix to (10) based on post-merger ownership
structure. I iterate this sequential process once more in spirit of best-response iter-
ation.43 The price model and the hypothetical model skip the derivation of a new
42This simulation design is an application of price-location game in Gandhi et al. (2008).
43I used a very tight tolerance to compute the equilibrium. The tolerance levels of product
characteristics and prices are 1e-12 and 1e-15, respectively.
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vector of product characteristics and search only new optimal prices.
After simulating the post-merger equilibrium, I compute quality index Q for each
product by taking an inner product of the set of endogenous characteristics and their
respective parameters,
Qjt =
2∑
r=1
∑
k
γr · x¯kjtβkr , k = O,F,M,D (20)
where γr is the percentage of type r passengers in the population.
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Further, I quantify the magnitude of product differentiation with two quality-
distance measures: within-firm distance and within-market distance (see figure 4).
I define a within-firm distance of product j as the closest quality-distance to other
goods produced by the same firm. For the merged firm’s products, if the distance
increases post-merger, it implies that the product becomes more differentiated so that
the cross-price effect can be weaker. On the other hand, a within-market distance
of product j is measured by the closest quality-distance to other goods produced
by competitors in the same market. A longer within-market distance post-merger
implies that the merged carrier can raise price easily based on less substitutability
to its competitors’ products.
II.5.2 Simulation Results
II.5.2.1 Changes in product characteristics
The histograms in figure 5 through 7 describe how the merged firm changes the
product characteristics.45 They show us two important findings: overall quality
44A primary reason of introducing the scalar-valued quality index is to provide more intuitive
interpretations for changes in product characteristics. It does not affect simulation results.
45Each number mounted on each bar in figure 5 through 7 is an average value of product quality
or characteristics over the corresponding products.
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degradation and higher product differentiation post-merger. The first implication is
shown by figure 5 (a). While the average quality index decreases for all groups of
markets after the merger, the quality degradation is severe in markets where the
merging carriers had market power before the merger.46 Specifically, markets where
both carriers had market power (indicated by DL & NW) show that the quality
decreases by 1.5% from 1.241 to 1.222. Sub-figures from 5 (b) to (e) suggest that
flight frequency changes the most, decreasing by 4.7% from 2.832 to 2.698. It amounts
to 12 less flights for each product during a quarter. The mishandled baggage rate and
denied boarding rate increase, respectively, by 1.1% from 6.048 to 6.113 and 2.1%
from 1.072 to 1.095, also supporting the quality degradation. When either carrier
had market power (DL only, NW only), the quality decreases as well. However, when
neither carrier had market power (Neither), the quality rarely changes. In short, the
combined firm lowers the product quality especially when it has a strong market
power. However, the incentive of quality degradation becomes weaker when strong
competitors exist because the potential risk of losing passengers increases.
To look at the second implication, I divide the merged firm’s products into large-,
medium-, and small-share goods (henceforth large, medium, and small goods, re-
spectively).47 Since a product is a unique combination of carrier and route, we can
regard a large good as a major route (or a primary good), and a small good as a
minor route (or a secondary good) in a market. A medium good refers to a route
serving medium-sized enplanements. Figure 6 (a) illustrates the changes in average
quality of three product groups in oligopoly markets. For the large goods including
692 products in 680 markets, the merged firm improves the quality by 0.8% from
46I define an airline has market power if it carries more than 25% of total market enplanements.
47If a product serves more than 50% of the carrier’s enplanements in a market, it is defined as a
large good. If less than 50% but at least 20%, it belongs to medium goods. The remaining goods
with less than 20% constitute small goods.
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1.319 to 1.330. Specifically, frequency increases by 1.6%, corresponding to adding
6 more flights per product during a quarter. Mishandled baggage rate and denied
boarding rate decrease by 0.6% and 0.9%, respectively. The medium goods show very
similar patterns. However, the small goods including 865 products in 3,598 markets
deteriorate substantially. The quality index decreases by 1.0% from 1.285 to 1.272
and the underlying characteristics become worse. The frequency reduces by 2.9%,
indicating 10 less flights per product during a quarter, and mishandled baggage rate
and denied boarding rate increase by 0.5% and 1.0%, respectively.48 To sum up, the
merged firm increases the product differentiation post-merger by upgrading large and
medium goods and downgrading small goods.
The higher product differentiation post-merger can be understood by the firm’s
profit-maximizing behavior. As I will show in subsection 5.2.2, the average profit
from large goods is much bigger than that from small goods. This motivates the
merged firm to move passengers from small goods to large or medium goods by
adjusting the product quality. To verify this argument, I compute the number of
passengers of each type who purchase the large, medium, and small goods pre- and
post-merger.49 It reveals that while total number of tickets sold in oligopoly markets
decreases post-merger, the proportion of large goods increases from 70.6% to 71.6%
and that of small goods decreases from 14.0% to 13.0%.50 Specifically, table 14
shows that the business group purchases more large goods and less small goods,
and the tourists’ consumptions decrease the most for small goods after the merger.
48I tested different definitions of large, medium, and small goods. The quality index changed
slightly depending on the definitions, but directions of quality changes were highly robust. The test
results are available upon request.
49For example, I computed a percentage of the business passengers who actually bought large
goods in the sample as:
∑T
t=1Mt · γ̂1 · L1tD1t
Dλ1t
1+Dλ1t
/
∑T
t=1
∑2
r=1Mt · γ̂r · LrtDrt
Dλrt
1+Dλrt
, where Drt =∑
k∈Jt e
(xktβ̂r+ξ̂kt)/λ̂, Lrt =
∑
l∈Lt e
(xltβ̂r+ξ̂lt)/λ̂, and Lt is the set of large goods produced by Delta
or Northwest Airlines in overlapped market t.
50We can check this based on table 14.
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Intuitively, the large goods are associated with major routes where a carrier’s hub
airports exist and they generate considerable profits. Therefore, the merged firm
takes better care of those routes to attract more passengers to them.
Figure 7 (a) provides the quality adjustment in monopoly markets. The simu-
lation sample contains only 28 products in 9 monopoly markets, but the pattern of
higher product differentiation post-merger still stands. A notable thing in monopoly
markets is that the quality changes are greater in absolute value, relative to oligopoly
markets. The quality of large goods increases by 6.4% from 1.342 to 1.428, and that
of small goods decreases by 7.4% from 1.328 to 1.230. We can understand the greater
quality changes by monopolist with table 14 again. After the merger, the business
group takes higher proportion of large goods in monopoly markets (66.7%) than in
oligopoly markets (53.9%). Also, the tourists buy bigger proportion of small goods
in monopoly markets (61.6%) compared to oligopoly markets (55.1%). Without
competition, monopolist can adjust product quality more flexibly toward extracting
more profits from each group. Even though the provided qualities can be higher or
lower than most preferred level by each type, consumers are more forced to choose a
particular product as the monopolist leads.
II.5.2.2 Changes in prices
How and to what extent does the product repositioning affect post-merger prices?
I present the results in table 7 and 8. Each table reports the quality index, the
endogenous characteristics (whose values are identical to those in figure 6 and 7),
and the quality-distance measures pre- and post-merger. Importantly, the bottom
panel describes the simulated price changes from three separate games.51
Table 7A is about the large goods in oligopoly markets. Notably, the within-
51Each number in the table 7 and 8 indicates the average value over the corresponding products.
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firm distance increases by 0.021 post-merger. This implies that the large goods
become more differentiated from medium and small goods due to the quality im-
provement. Meanwhile, the within-market distance decreases very little, indicating
that they become slightly more substitutable to competitors’ products. Based on
the repositioning of large goods, we can expect the merged firm to have a difficulty
in internalizing cross-price effect.
I examine this hypothesis by comparing the cross-price effects CPEP and CPEFL
in the bottom panel. The second column indicates the cross price effect in the price
model: CPEP =$4.9. The third and fourth column present price changes under
the full model and the hypothetical model, respectively, and finally the cross-price
effect in the full model is calculated in the last column: CPEFL =$2.2. Consistent
with the hypothesis, the merged carrier internalizes a lower cross-price effect given
the quality adjustment: CPEP > CPEFL. Even though the quality improvement
causes price increase: ∆P from ∆X =$1.5, it does not surpass the reduction of
cross-price effect. Therefore, when the product characteristics are endogenized, the
simulation predicts a lower price increase than the typical merger analysis due to the
higher product differentiation: P P > P FL.
If so, why does the merged firm raise the product differentiation? This issue
leads us to see profit changes. In table 7A again, the full model predicts lower
marginal cost and more passengers relative to the price model. The cost reduction
is possible due to the increased frequency, and the attraction of more consumers is
based on the enhanced quality. All these changes allow the merged firm to increase
profit per product by $540 in the full model, which is much bigger than $190 in the
price model. The additional profits correspond to $0.37 million and $0.13 million,
respectively, when multiplied by the number of large goods. To sum up, although
the higher product differentiation reduces the ability of raising price, it can generate
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more profit.52
The medium goods show very similar patterns to the case of large goods (see
table 7B). One difference is that the within-market distance slightly increases post-
merger. It can positively affect the cross-price effect in the full model. However, it
still predicts smaller price increase than the price model by showing CPEP ($9.5) >
CPEFL($6.9) and P P > P FL.
Interestingly, small goods show very different aspects compared to large and
medium goods. Even though the small goods become more differentiated from other
product groups due to their quality degradation (the within-firm distance increases
by 0.012 post-merger), the full model predicts a greater cross-price effect than the
price model: CPEFL($34.2) > CPEP ($24.1). It seems implausible, but is still
consistent with profit-maximizing decision in two aspects. First, unlike other prod-
uct groups, the within-market distance considerably increases, implying that the
small goods become less substitutable to competitors’ products. This encourages
the merged firm to increase price. Second, small goods generate very small profit
per product pre-merger. The profits are $59.1k, $6.9k, and $2.0k for large, medium,
and small goods, respectively. Thus, the significant price increase (together with
the quality degradation) of small goods can contribute to transferring consumers to
other profitable goods.
Table 8 reports the simulation results for monopoly markets. While they exhibit
similar patterns, one difference is that prices of all product groups increase to a
greater extent in the monopoly markets than in the oligopoly markets. One possible
explanation is that the monopolist does not consider the within-market substitutabil-
ity.
52Section 5.3 will address the profit analysis more thoroughly.
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II.5.3 Welfare Analysis
This section assesses how the post-merger equilibrium affects the welfare. The de-
mand parameters indicate that two types of consumers have heterogeneous tastes for
the characteristics and price. On the supply side, the simulation results reveal that
the merged firm repositions the large, medium, and small goods differently. This en-
courage us to examine the consumer surplus of each type and the producer surplus
from each product group.
II.5.3.1 Consumer welfare
I measure changes in consumer welfare by the compensating variation. Following
Small and Rosen (1981), the compensating variation for a type r passenger in market
t is given by
CVrt =
V prert − V postrt
αr
, (21)
where αr < 0 is the marginal disutility from price increase. Pre-merger term is
defined as V prert = ln
[
1 + (
∑
j∈Jt e
(xprejt βr+ξjt)/λ)λ
]
, and V postrt is analogously defined to
V prert replacing x
pre
jt by x
post
jt . Then, the change in the average per-passenger surplus
in market t is measured by CSt =
∑2
r=1 γr · CVrt, and the change in total consumer
surplus is the sum of CSt in all markets: CS =
∑
tMt ·CSt where Mt is the market
size.
Table 9 reports the welfare effect based on the price model GP and the full model
GFL. In the first panel covering all markets, GP predicts a decrease in consumer
welfare for both types. Since this game predicts substantial price increase, holding
the product characteristics fixed at pre-merger level, the welfare loss is a natural
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result.
However, GFL predicts substantially different outcomes in two aspects. First,
the overall consumer welfare increases. To be specific, the tourists still experience
the welfare losses (-$0.36 million), but the business passengers benefit significantly
from the merger ($2.22 million). For the price-insensitive business group, utility
gains from large and medium goods (associated with the quality improvement and
the lower price increase) are greater than their losses from small goods (associated
with the quality degradation and the greater price increase). However, for the price-
sensitive tourists, the welfare losses from the price increase surpass the potential
gains from quality improvement of large and medium goods. In overall, the amount
of benefits to the business group largely surpasses the losses to the tourists.53 The
result reveals that if the set of repositioned products exhibits more differentiation
post-merger, it mitigates the welfare loss from the price increase and even leads to
increases in consumer welfare. Recent studies on endogenous product choice have
found that merger can have a positive effect on consumer welfare if the merged firm
changes its product offerings which consumers value more (see, e.g. Mazzeo et al.,
2013). My finding is consistent with the literature and provides new evidence from
the airline industry.
Second, the tourist group experiences smaller loss in GFL than in GP . As table
14 shows, the number of tourists who purchase large or medium goods is not much
different pre- and post-merger, but for small goods, it largely decreases. That is, a
substantial portion of the tourists moves to large, medium, or outside goods, facing
53As section 4.2 showed, the tourists account for 59.5% of actual travelers and for 94.8% of
potential travelers. Considering the significant proportions, it seems unreasonable that the tourists’
welfare losses are much smaller than the business travelers’ gains. However, the tourists are shown
to exhibit about ten times as much price sensitivity as the business group (α2/α1 = 10.2). When
computing the compensating variation for each type, a change in the indirect utility is divided by
the respective price coefficient for converting it into dollar value. This makes a scale of the tourists’
losses drop to a tenth so that it becomes largely surpassed by business travelers’ gains.
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the dramatic increase in price of small goods.54 Since GFL predicts lower prices for
large and medium goods than GP , the welfare losses by the tourists become smaller
in GFL.
In the second panel table 9, we can observe the same patterns of welfare changes
in both monopoly and oligopoly markets. The bottom panel presents another aspect.
I divide markets into Quality-increase (QI) and Quality-decrease (QD) markets. If
a weighted average quality of the merged firm’s products in a market increases post-
merger, I define it as QI market, otherwise it belongs to QD market.55 While the
welfare changes in the QI markets follow the overall trend well, the consumer surplus
in QD markets become worse off. This is because the overall quality degradation
prevents the business group from getting significant welfare gains. I compare the
features of two groups of markets (see table 12) and observe that QI markets consist
of more competitive routes where the merging carriers had relatively small market
presence pre-merger. This confirms that the lack of market competition results in
worse product quality, and thus negatively affect the consumer welfare.
II.5.3.2 Profits and social welfare
Endogenizing product characteristics crucially affects firms’ profits as well. In the
top panel of table 10, the price model GP predicts that merged carrier increases
profits by $0.17 million, but the merger lowers the competitors’ profits by $0.30
million, causing the overall producer surplus to decrease. On the other hand, the full
model GFL forecasts further increases in the merged firm’s profit by $0.68 million
and smaller decreases in the competitors’ profits by $0.12 million, leading to increase
in the producer surplus. A closer look at the computed outcome reveals that the
54In table 7 and 8, GFL predicts that small goods become more expensive than large and medium
goods on average post-merger.
55I use the number of passengers of each product as the weight.
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higher gain to the merged firms is due to higher markup, and the lower losses to
the competitors are based on increased number of consumers who switch from the
merged firm due to the overall quality degradation and the price increase.56 Once two
carriers are combined, the pre-merger characteristics may no longer be at the profit-
maximizing level. GP ignores this, but GFL finds new equilibrium characteristics and
prices allowing higher profits for the merged carrier. The pattern of profit changes
is observable in monopoly, oligopoly, and QI markets.
In QD markets, however, not only competitors but also the merged firm loses
profit in GFL, even though the amount of loss by the merged firm is very small. The
main reason is a large decrease in the passenger enplanements. The merged firm
carries less 0.9% of passengers in QI markets, but it loses 2.6% of passengers in QD
markets, which is large enough to completely offset the gains from higher markups.
Finally, the bottom panel shows that the merged firm increases profit from all groups
of products, but mostly from large and medium goods.
Table 11 describes change in the social welfare. Expectedly, two simulations pro-
duce completely different outcomes. While GP leads the social welfare to decrease
by $1.70 million, GFL predicts it to increase by $2.41 million based on the increase
not only in consumer surplus but also in producer surplus. The quality improve-
ment of large and medium goods contributes to increasing utility gains especially of
business travelers, on the other hand, the merged firm extracts more profits from
the consumers who switch to more profitable goods. In overall, when a merger sim-
ulation endogenizes product characteristics, it produces quite different results from
traditional simulation in terms of the post-merger equilibrium and the welfare effects.
56The average markups of the merged firm are $150.1 and $157.4 in GP and GFL, respectively,
and the average passenger enplanements by competitors are 172,304 and 172,733 in GP and GFL,
respectively.
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II.5.4 Comparison between Simulation Result and Actual Post-merger Outcome
In this section, I evaluate the predictive performance of my simulation by comparing
the simulated result with actual post-merger data. Notice that both the price model
GP and the full model GFL rely on the same set of assumptions regarding demand,
cost, and firms’ conduct. One difference is that only GFL allows the changes in
product characteristics post-merger. In this sense, the comparison can be a test of
the endogeneity assumption.
To make such a comparison feasible, I exclude several markets from the compar-
ison sample. Specifically, I drop a market if the merged carrier does not serve it any
longer, or if the number of carriers, LCCs, and routes within a market substantially
change after the merger.57 This is for controlling the exogenous changes such as
entry and exit occurrence in routes or markets that the model does not take account
of. The final comparison sample consists of 244 markets. The bottom panel of table
13 shows that the characteristics of the selected markets do not change much over
the integration period.
Importantly, I restrict this analysis to comparing flight frequency. I consider that
the set of product characteristics is the first to be derived in the sequential choice
model and the frequency changes the most among the endogenous characteristics.
Hence, if the simulated frequency is substantially different from the actual post-
merger frequency, further comparison analyses on prices and welfare effects would
not be a very meaningful tasks.58 I compare the frequencies by market level rather
57Among 1,129 markets in the simulation sample, I exclude 154 markets the merged carrier exited
as of first quarter of 2010. Further, I drop 731 markets where a change in the number of carriers
is greater than three, or a change in the number of LCCs is greater than two, or a change in the
number of routes is greater than five.
58Other product characteristics are not appropriate for the comparison analysis. The data on
mishandled baggage rate and denied boarding rate are available only at carrier level (see table
1), whereas the simulation outcomes are carrier-route specific. Also, on-time performance rarely
changes according to the simulation.
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than by product level because the set of merged firm’s products in a market has
changed post-merger.59
The top panel of table 13 presents the result. The first column reports average
market frequency (henceforth, AMF) pre-merger which GP relies on.60 The second
and the third column report the simulated AMF from GFL and actual AMF post-
merger, respectively. The table shows two clear trends. First, the simulated and
actual AMF decrease from pre-merger AMF by 0.33 and 0.46, respectively. The
reductions correspond to 7,247 (=0.33 × 90 × 244) and 10,102 (=0.46 × 90 × 244)
less flights during a quarter in the selected markets. This pattern is observable in
both monopoly and oligopoly markets. Second, the simulated and actual AMF move
in the same direction. They increase in QI markets and decrease in QD markets,
while actual AMF changes more. The results implies that even though GFL under-
or overestimates actual AMF, it better predicts post-merger outcomes than GP .
To be more specific, I illustrate market frequency (henceforth, MF) of each market
in figure 8. Figure 8 (a) shows that the probability density function of actual MF
(solid line) shifts to the right from that of pre-merger MF (dotted line) in QI markets.
Figure 8 (b) shows that actual MF generally lies above pre-merger MF. Both figures
indicate the increase of actual MF in QI markets. A notable thing is that the
simulated MF is located closer to actual one than pre-merger MF is. The density
function of the simulated MF shifts to the right, and its bar plot in each market fits
actual MF line better. Figure 8 (c) and (d) describe the result in QD markets. They
59For example, the merging carriers served the Chicago to New Orleans market with two connect-
ing flights: (in order of origin-outward connecting-destination-inward connecting airport) ORD-
ATL-MSY-ATL and ORD-MEM-MSY-MEM pre-merger, but MDW-ATL-MSY-ATL and ORD-
MEM-MSY-ATL post-merger. Even though the number of routes are same, airports in the
itineraries are slightly different. This prevents the comparison by product level.
60Market frequency (MF) is defined as sum of frequency of each product provided by merg-
ing/merged carriers in a market: MFt =
∑Jft
j=1 Frequencyjt, where j is a product and t is a
market. Then, average market frequency (AMF) is mean value of market frequency across markets:
AMF = 1T
∑T
t=1MFt.
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show quite the opposite situation where the density function of the simulated MF
shifts to the left following actual MF and its bar plot also fits in well with actual MF
line mostly lying below pre-merger MF.
Figure 9 describes an overall pattern by getting QI and QD markets together.
In figure 9 (a), the density function of actual MF significantly deviates from that of
pre-merger MF, and the simulated MF is located between them in general. Finally,
the bar plots in figure 9 (b) to (d) confirm again that the simulated MF better follows
actual MF line than pre-merger MF does. In short, the comparison analysis suggests
that endogenizing product characteristics is essential to better predict the actual
post-merger outcome.
II.6 Conclusion
When a merger simulation ignores changes in product characteristics post-merger,
it can lead to a significant bias in predicted prices and welfare effects. This paper
overcomes the limitations by endogenizing both price and product characteristics in
a two-stage oligopoly game. Using data from the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion, I estimate the model parameters and then simulate the effect of the Delta and
Northwest Airlines merger on product characteristics, fares, and welfare. To evaluate
the predictive performance of the simulation, I compare the simulated outcome with
actual post-merger data.
The main findings are as follows. First, the merged firm tends to increase product
differentiation post-merger. The firm increases the quality of large and medium
goods, but decrease that of small goods. The magnitude of the changes are stronger
in monopoly markets. Since the large and medium goods are more profitable, the
merged firm takes better care of their qualities to attract more passengers to them.
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Second, the higher product differentiation affects the merged firm’s incentive to
raise prices. For large and medium goods, the full model predicts smaller cross-price
effects than the price model. But for small goods, the cross-price effect is greater
in the full model. The decreased quality and the increased price of small goods
contributes to moving the consumers to large or medium goods.
Third, endogenizing product characteristics leads to quite different welfare effects.
While the price model predicts decrease in consumer welfare for both types of pas-
sengers, the full model predicts that the business passengers benefit from the merger
($2.22 million) and the tourists experience smaller losses (-$0.36 million). This leads
to an overall increase in consumer welfare. The finding highlights that a merger can
increase consumer welfare if the merged firm brings the repositioned products that
consumers can value more. About producer surplus, both models predicts higher
profit for the merged firm and less profits for the competitors, but the additional
profit gain for the merged firm is much bigger in the full model ($0.68 million) than
in the price model ($0.17 million).
Finally, endogenizing product characteristics contributes to better predicting ac-
tual post-merger outcome. In QI markets, the simulated and actual post-merger
frequency increase from pre-merger frequency. In QD markets, on the other hand,
they decrease from pre-merger one. For both cases, the probability density func-
tion of the simulated is located between those of pre-merger and actual post-merger
frequency.
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CHAPTER III
AIRPORT-AIRLINE VERTICAL CONTRACT AND MARKET POWER IN THE
U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
III.1 Introduction
Vertical contracts between airline and airports are widely used and can benefit both
parties. From an airport’s point of view, long-term contracts can increase aeronau-
tical revenues61 by encouraging airlines to concentrate their traffics at the airport as
part of a hub-and-spoke network (Brueckner, 2002). Hubbing, in turn, attracts more
passengers so that it can generate higher concession revenues.62 From a carrier’s
perspective, when it performs large-scale operations in terms of the number flights
and the number of occupying gates at an airport, it is likely to increase own market
share by providing frequent flight schedules on various routes.
Among various forms of vertical contracts,63 this paper focuses on the case of
“signatory carriers”, which refers to a setting where airlines have fully executed
Use-and-Lease Agreements with an airport.64 Under the agreements, the airport
grants three special rights to signatory airlines. First, the carriers are able to solely
61Aeronautical revenues include aviation service charges such as landing fees, terminal, and gate
rentals paid by airlines. On the other hand, non-aeronautical (or concession) revenues encom-
pass parking fees, car rentals, banking, catering, and other service revenues mostly received from
passengers.
62In this sense, many studies indicate that there exists a positive demand externality between
aeronautical services and concession revenues (Fu and Zhang, 2010; Oum and Fu, 2008).
63Main types of contracts are summarized well in Fu et al. (2011), who classify vertical alliances
into ‘signatory airlines’, ‘airline ownership of airport facilities’, ‘long-term use contracts’, ‘issuance
of airport revenue bonds’, and ‘concession revenue sharing’.
64In this paper, I need to distinguish hub carrier from signatory carrier. Most Hub carriers
are signatory carriers, but not vice versa. For example, as of Fiscal year 2004, Dallas/Fort Worth
airport had 25 active signatory airlines. Among them, only two carriers, American and Delta airline
were hub carriers (DFW, 2004).
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occupy certain airport facilities such as departing/arriving gates, ticket counters, and
baggage claim areas for extended periods (e.g. twenty years). Second, the airline
can sublease any under-utilized facilities to other carriers possibly at premium prices.
Finally, most large and medium sized airports allow Majority-In-Interest (MII) power
wherein signatory carriers can delay or prevent airport capital-development projects.
Several governmental reports (e.g. Department of Transportation, 1999; General
Accounting Office, 1990) point out that these contractual practices can be anti-
competitive because they can effectively limit competitors’ access to gates and other
key facilities. Recently, Ciliberto and Williams (2010) found that the limited access
to airport facilities is a critical source of the well known hub premium.
Motivated by the previous studies, I aim to extend Ciliberto and Williams (2010)
by providing more structural descriptions. Ciliberto and Williams (2010) uses the
three business practices as measures of the barriers to entry and estimates a linear
specification of the reduced-form pricing equation. With this approach, the paper
could clarify to what extent the operating practices explain the hub premium. How-
ever the practices, especially a carrier’s gate control can affect not only consumer
utility but also its marginal cost. If a carrier’s gate-dominance allows significant
market power by shifting demand upward, it is likely to increases air fares. On the
other hand, if gate dominance reduces its marginal cost through several possible
channels (explained in section 2), then ticket prices can decrease. In this respect,
the estimates from the reduced-form regression represent the net effect of the gate
control on both sides. The primary goal of this paper is to identify the effects of
the contractual arrangements on demand and supply separately. Initially, I estimate
a pricing equation (similar to Ciliberto and Williams (2010)), and then deepen the
analysis with structural estimation. Moreover, by utilizing advantage of the struc-
tural approach, I examine how hypothetical regulations affect carriers’ fares, costs,
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and profits.
I work with three main data sources. First, Competition Plans collected from
thirty one hub airports provide details on gate lease agreements, sublease agreements,
and majority-in-interest (MII) clauses. I also use data sets DB1B containing fare and
ticket information, published by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Fi-
nally, to create additional route characteristics, I utilize the T-100 Segment database,
also maintained by the DOT .
From the reduced form estimation, I confirm that the three contractual practices
are crucial determinants of the hub premium. Specifically, the coefficients of hub vari-
ables decrease by almost fifty percent after I control the contractual agreements.65
Importantly, with following structural estimation, I find that gate-dominance enables
signatory carriers to have substantial market power (shifting demand upwards), as
well as to take cost advantages (shifting supply downwards). On demand side, a car-
rier’s gate-occupancy has a positive effect on passenger utility, and business travelers
have thirteen times larger Willingness to Pay (WTP) for gate than tourist travelers.
The result supports that better services from more gates satisfy consumers who want
convenience, and that the extensive airline network based on the control of a large
fraction of gates can hold more appeal for business passengers. On supply side, a
five percent increase in the gates leased at the origin airport leads to $2.5 reduction
in the airline’s marginal cost. Furthermore, the existence of sublease agreement at
an airport is likely to increase non-signatory carriers’ marginal cost, whereas MII
clauses increase signatory carriers’ marginal cost. In overall, these cost effects as-
sociated with the clauses are more likely to occur at congested airports. From the
counterfactual simulation, I find that the conversion of exclusive gates to commonly
65Hub variables include two dummies, HubOrg and HubDst. HubOrg (HubDst) equals 1 for a
hub carrier at an origin (destination) airport.
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available gates at airports can reduce the differentials in costs and profits between
signatory and non-signatory airlines.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed discussion of
business practices associated with the case of signatory airline. Section 3 describes
the dataset. Section 4 presents the structural model of demand and supply. In section
5, I explain estimation procedures and instrumental variables. Section 6 report the
results of the estimations and counterfactual analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper
with a brief summary.
III.2 Contractual Practices between Signatory Airlines and Airports
In this section, I describe three key contractual practices and specify hypotheses
on how the long-term gate contracts influence the demand and supply of aviation
services.
III.2.1 Gate Use-and-Lease Agreements
Airports lease gates to carriers mainly through two gate lease agreements. Under
‘exclusive’ agreement, airlines have ‘full rights’ to gates. Full rights mean that the
carrier does not have to share its gates with other carriers even if the gates are
under-utilized.66 In some cases, they can develop ‘preferential’ agreement,67 which
is similar to exclusive rights except there exists a ‘use it or share it’ requirement.68
Through these agreements, signatory airlines can ensure gate dominance, and make
66In general gate utilization is based on number of daily operations. For example, a minimum of
three flights/weekday is required for signatory airlines.
67According to ACI-NA survey (1998), 56 percent of gates at thirty hub airports were leased on
exclusive basis, and the remaining gates were leased on preferential (33%), or on common basis
(11%).
68According to the requirement, if minimum utilization criterion is not met, the signatory airline
is subject to sharing its under-utilized gates with other carriers. But in most cases, signatory
airlines do satisfy it.
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it difficult for new entrants to obtain gates and serve the airport.
I expect gate dominance can be positively correlated with passenger utility in
two ways. First, a dominant carrier may occupy more convenient gates, and it
can produce better services in terms of on-time performance. As Mazzeo (2003)
indicated, actual taxi-in times69 for flights by major carriers was significantly lower
than others.70 Second, gate availability also permits an airline to expand the size
of the airline network in terms of the number of routes and destinations served.
Especially for consumers who regularly fly to multiple destinations, the extensive
network becomes more attractive since it will increase the expected values of frequent
flier programs (Lederman, 2008).
Next, from supply-side perspectives, I hypothesize that a carrier’s gate-dominance
can keep its marginal costs down. This is possible through three conceivable chan-
nels. Most directly, signatory airlines pay a lower price for use of the airport’s
facilities, compared to non-signatory carriers. As of January 2012, Chicago O’hare
airport charged $82/sqft of terminal rent and $5.7/1,000lbs of landing fee for sig-
natory airlines, but for non-signatory carriers, these charges were $110.7/sqft and
$7.2/1000lbs, respectively. These fee differentials can be found at most U.S. airports
(see table 16). In addition, long-term gate contracts can reduce transaction cost. The
transactions include allocation of terminals, gates, ticket counters, loading bridges,
and airline administrative spaces. Suppose that these facilities are assigned on a
daily basis without long-term contract, and then airline and airport should manage
plenty of operational transactions day after day, which cause increased cost with high
frequency of transactions.
Finally, a carrier’s gate dominance is closely related to economies of traffic den-
69This term refers to the time elapsed between wheels-on and gate arrival at the destination
airport.
70A lower taxi-in-times can affect a carrier’s cost, too.
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sity.71 Based on Competition Plans and T-100 dataset, I found a significantly positive
correlation between gate dominance (average number of gates controlled by a carrier
at both endpoint cities) and route dominance (the number of flights on the route).
This in turn can lead to a greater traffic density which eventually contributes to
reduced marginal cost of carrying an extra passenger.
III.2.2 Sublease Agreement
Signatory carriers can sublease their gates to new entrant carriers. As Ciliberto and
Williams (2010) states, when a new entrant carrier want to begin flight service at an
airport where there exist no gates available, its main alternative is to sublease gates
from major carriers. Table 17 shows tenant/sub-tenant relationships at Dallas/Fort
Worth airport in 2001. Note that such subleasing involves direct negotiation between
signatory airlines and new-entrants without any arbitration or intervention by the
airport authority. Even if the requesting airline successfully identifies unused gates,
they may be required to use the ground-handling services of the primary tenant air-
line, while they desire to self-handle or use another party (DOT, 1999). Furthermore,
many airport authorities exercise no control over sublease fees, possibly resulting in
higher costs to the sublessee. According to Competition Plans collected, sublease
agreements were being practiced at seventeen airports between 2002 and 2005, but
only six had fixed limits on sublease fees.72 Under the circumstances, I expect the ex-
istence of sublease agreement at an airport will increase sub-tenant carriers’ marginal
costs. However, I do not expect passenger utility to be affected by subleasing at an
airport, mainly because whether a boarding gate for a passenger is subleased or not
is rarely important in travel decisions. Thus, I consider sublease agreement only in
71Economies of density exist if marginal cost decrease as flights or seats are added on a route.
72the airports include Austin, Washington Reagan, Minneapolis, Oakland, San Antonio, and San
Francisco airport.
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marginal cost equation.
III.2.3 Majority-In-Interest Clauses
The MII provisions authorize signatory carriers not only to review a specific airport
expansion project but also to approve or disapprove it. While the project may include
construction of additional terminals, gates, and other essential facilities which can
accommodate new entrants, the signatory carriers can deny it since the costs of
the new project can be included in the rates and charges to themselves.73 If the
plan does not receive MII approval, the airport may have to delay or abandon it.
For this reason, MII clauses have been criticized as anti-competitive (DOT, 1999).
Competition Plans indicate that 22 out of 31 airports allow MII clauses (see table
18) and 11 airports experienced actual invocation.
I expect the MII provisions to have mixed effects on carriers’ marginal cost. The
existence of the clauses at an airport can raise signatory carriers cost because they
are responsible for covering sufficient airport operating expenses based on a residual
fee methodology. At the same time, it can decrease the carriers cost by reducing the
number of airport projects financed by themselves. For a similar reason to the case
of sublease agreement, whether an airport allows MII power or not does not seem to
be relevant to traveler’s utility, thus I specify the clause only in cost side.
73While use-and-lease agreement generally specifies terms and conditions for using airfield and
terminal facilities, it also defines financial responsibility. Under a residual agreement, signatory
airlines are financially responsible for airport operating expenses not covered by non-aeronautical
revenue and aeronautical revenue paid by non-signatory airlines. Under a compensatory agreement,
airlines are charged only for the facilities and services that they actually use. Finally, a hybrid
agreement combines elements of the two agreements. 84% of the residual and 74% of hybrid use-
and-lease agreements involve MII clauses (ACINA, 1998). The issue related with this typology has
been further investigated by Hartmann (2006).
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III.3 Data and Variable Construction
In this section, I describe data sources and explain how I constructed variables rep-
resenting the contractual agreements and other control variables.
III.3.1 Competition Plan Data
In the interest of promoting competitive environment at the U.S. airports, the Wen-
dell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (also known
as AIR-21) was enacted on April 5, 2000. AIR-21 has targeted at medium to large
hub airports dominated by one or two airlines with more than fifty percent of the
airport’s total enplanements.74 While the number of airports covered varies each
year, the act has required the airports to submit ‘Airport Competition Plan’ to the
DOT.75 In total, I collected thirty one plans by contacting with officials of each air-
port (see table 18). Each plan provides specific information on the total number of
gates available, the number of gates leased on exclusive (or preferential) agreement,
sublease arrangement, and MII clauses at the airport.
III.3.1.1 Competition plan variables
Based on the Competition Plans, several variables are constructed as follows. First,
I create the variable GateShareOriginkm, which represents the percentage of gates
exclusively or preferentially leased to airline k at origin airport of route m. Similarly
I define GateShareDestkm for destination airport. I decided not to distinguish be-
tween exclusive and preferential gates because in practice two agreements are little
74If an airport carries less than 1.0%, but at least 0.25% of total national enplanements, it is
categorized as medium-hub airport. Airports with at least 1.0% of total national enplanements are
large-hub airports.
75During fiscal year 2004-2005 and 2010-2011, 41 and 36 airports submitted Competition Plans,
respectively.
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different in terms of retaining a primary right to use the gates.76 Table 15 indicates
that on average one airline controls 14 percent of gates at origin airport, and 12 per-
cent at destination airport. As extreme cases, Continental airlines occupy 78.6% of
gates at Houston Intercontinental (IAH), Northwest airlines control 79.0% at Mem-
phis (MEM).77 Figure 10 indicates the number of gates available and gates leased on
exclusive (or preferential) agreements at thirty one medium and large hub airports.
Second, for sublease arrangement, I define SubleaseOriginm as indicator variable,
which is equal to 1 if sublease agreements were being practiced for the year shown
in Competition Plan at origin airport of route m. In a similar way, SubleaseDestm
is defined for destination airport. Table 18 shows that sublease agreements between
signatory and small carriers exist at 17 out of 31 airports, including most large hub
airports (e.g. Atlanta, Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, Chicago O’Hare, Philadelphia
airports).78
Finally, the variable MiiOriginm equals 1 if an origin airport on route m allows
MII provision in its use and lease agreements. Similarly, MiiDestm is constructed
for destination airport. Table 18 indicates that 22 out of 31 airports were subject to
MII power.79
Even though Competition Plans help to identify these variables, the data have one
76For the same reason, Ciliberto and Williams (2010) uses the variables ’OwnGatesOrigin’ and
’OwnGatesDest’, which measure the percentage of gates leased on an exclusive or preferential basis.
77In total, there are 103 gates at IAH and 81 gates at MEM as of 2004.
78Competition Plans also offer some information on whether the airport puts sublease fee ceilings,
and on what the actual cap is. However, I decided not to use the information because not a few
airports answered with a vaguely worded statement. For example, one airport answered as follows;
If the requesting airline feels that the sublease fee proposed by the signatory airline is too high,
the requesting airline may complain to airport manager. If airport manager agrees that the rate is
unreasonable, it can deny the signatory airline’s right to sublease the space unless a more agreeable
cost structure is developed.
79To better understand the effect of MII clauses, I tried to find out whether MII power had been
actually invoked to delay or prevent any capital construction projects at an airport. But I feel
unsuccessful in identifying this point, because descriptions of the invocation of MII clause are also
vague.
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potential limitation. The airline data (DB1B and T-100 Segment Data) come from
the second quarter in 2004, but Competition Plans (collected and used) are varying
in terms of the filing year. In table 18, while 28 out of 31 plans were submitted
during 2002, 2003, and 2004, remaining ones were produced during 2001, 2006, and
2007 by Ontario, Albuquerque, and Tucson airport, respectively.
To address this issue, first, I thoroughly compared multiple plans collected from
the same airport but written in different years (e.g. the 2000, 2001, and 2003 plans
of the San Francisco airport). This comparison reveals that most airports have ex-
perienced little change during filing years in terms of total number of gates and
the number of gates controlled by each carrier. Table 19 details this aspect at San
Francisco airport. During three fiscal years, the first six carriers (Alaska, American,
Continental, Delta, Northwest, and United airline) did not change their gate occu-
pancy, while the remaining carriers showed little variation. Also, neither sublease
agreements nor MII clauses changed. Second, it is noteworthy that airport-airline
contracts have been signed on a long-term basis. GAO (1990) reported that 27 per-
cent of gates at 66 medium to large airports were leased for a 3-10 year period, 25
percent of gates for an 11-20 year period, and 35 percent of gates for a more than 20
year period.
III.3.2 Airline Data
The main source of airline data is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B),
published by the U.S. DOT. This database is a ten percent random sample of all
domestic tickets that originate in the U.S. each quarter. It provides specific infor-
mation on the route of travel, fare, and other data. Using this information, I defined
market, product, and several control variables (see table 15) which represent carrier,
airport, and route characteristics. I obtained additional route characteristics from
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T-100 Domestic Segment Database, which contains domestic and nonstop segment
data each month, reported by all U.S. carriers. With this database, I created flight
frequency and the number of seats available for each carrier-route.
The airline data are from the second quarter of 2004. The primary reason for
choosing the period is that domestic output (e.g. total passenger enplanements
and revenue passenger-miles) had recovered from a post-9/11 downturn by 2004.
Furthermore, the year 2004 is well-matched with filing years of Competition Plans
collected.
The sample is restricted to all domestic routes between the thirty one hub air-
ports. I keep only round-trip itineraries within U.S. continent with at most four
segments. Also, I drop tickets cheaper than $40 or more expensive than $1,800.
The lower bound is to eliminate tickets purchased using frequent flyer miles, and
the higher bound is to restrict the sample to coach-class travel. The final sample
contains 167,348 round-trip tickets.
III.3.2.1 Market and product
Following Berry and Jia (2010), market and product are defined as follows. A market
is a directional round trip between origin and destination airport. For instance,
Chicago-Detroit is a different market from Detroit-Chicago. This definition allows
us to differentiate the characteristics of the origin city from those of destination city.
The market size is the geometric mean of the MSA population of two end-point cities.
A product is a unique combination of market, carrier, direct (or connecting), and
binned fare during a quarter. Given observed market and carrier, fares of many
tickets are close to each other. For example, the sample has $616 and $617 tickets
from Atlanta to Chicago by Delta airline. Facing these tickets, consumers may not
recognize them as two different products. Based on the consideration, I combined
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tickets with similar fares into a single product by applying progressive fare bins.80
Set of bins is as follows: $20 increments for all tickets between $40 and $700 (e.g.
tickets between $500 and $520 with the same market and carrier are aggregated
to have same price $510), $50 for tickets between $700 and $1000, and $100 for
tickets between $1,000 and $1,800. In order to check whether the estimation results
are sensitive to the bin size, I also estimated with smaller and larger bin size as a
robustness check. However, I do not consider direct and connecting itinerary as the
same product no matter how their fares are close to each other. In summary, the
final sample is composed of 58,612 products in 888 different markets.
It should be noted that a true choice set of a consumer may only consists of tickets
that are available for the desired travel date on or around the time of the purchase
date. Unfortunately, DB1B database do not contain any information on date of
purchase and date of travel. With the limited data, I have no choice but to rely on
the assumption that all tickets observed in a given quarter are in any passenger’s
choice set during the quarter. Some other airline studies have used a panel of DB1B
data using the mean price (or certain percentiles of the price distribution) for any
given market. However, since I only have the Competition Plans at one point in time
for each airport, this option is not desirable for this study. Ideally, one can overcome
the possible misspecification of the choice set by using individual transaction level
data which are only available from a large Computer Reservation System (CRS).
III.3.2.2 Control variables
To get more accurate effects of the Competition Plan variables, I control several
factors affecting consumer utility and/or carrier marginal cost. On the demand side,
80When an individual round-trip ticket is considered as a product, memory requirement and
estimation time are likely to seriously increase. This is because the product shares need to be
inverted at each iteration in the frame of random coefficient logit model (described in section 4)
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I control a Constant, Distance (a round trip distance between origin and destination
airport), and Layovers (the number of total connections per round trip, 0 for direct
flights, and 2 for connecting flights).81 To account for possible inconvenience at
congested airports, I include Slot − control (the number of slot-controlled airports
on itinerary). Two slot-controlled airports in the sample are Chicago O’Hare (ORD),
Reagan National (DCA). As a measure of appeal to tourists, I define Tour (a dummy
variable, 1 if the itinerary has an endpoint in Florida or Nevada). Considering that
a hub-and-spoke network affects both aircraft size and flight frequency (Brueckner,
2002), I include Nseat (number of seats available in an aircraft) and Frequency
(average daily departures in a quarter by an airline) to control some part of hub-
effects. Notably, both Nseat and Frequency can be endogenous in this research. In
most airline studies, they are assumed to be pre-determined factors because carriers
cannot adjust them at least in the short run. Unlike them, this paper considers
the ‘long-term’ contractual agreements, and it is likely that gate availability affects
aircraft size and flight frequency especially when facing the shift in the demand in the
long run. To handle this potential endogeneity issue, I applied a set of instruments
for the variables (discussed in section 5).
On the cost side, I expect that a carrier’s marginal cost depends on several factors
other than Competition Plan variables. I control two distance measuresDistanceshort
and Distancelong, considering that fuel efficiency can differ depending on aircraft
size, and different sizes of fleets are allocated on short-haul and long-haul routes.82
Similarly, I control Layoversshort and Layoverslong based on two considerations.
81Technically, ‘direct’ means that passengers do not change planes between origin and destination,
while ‘non-stop’ means that the flight does not stop between origin and destination. In this paper,
I use both terms to refer to flights that do not stop between origin and destination.
82I create an indicator variable Ilong=1 if a market distance is longer than 3,000 miles and
Ishort=1 if a market distance is shorter than 3,000 miles. Then the distance measures are computed
as Distancelong = Distance ∗ Ilong and Distanceshort = Distance ∗ Ishort.
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Connecting flights involve an additional landing/takeoff during which airplanes burn
a large fraction of fuel, and the fraction of fuel consumed at takeoff is known to
vary with aircraft size.83 On the other hand, the connections may allow carriers to
generate high load factor in hub-and-spoke network system, resulting in decreased
marginal cost. Thus, the coefficient of layovers will be determined by the magnitudes
of two countervailing effects. Finally, I create carrier dummies on both demand
and supply side in order to measure brand specific effects. Major airlines include
Continental (CO), Delta (DL), Northwest (NW ), United (UA), US Airway (US),
and the base carrier, American (AA). Two low cost carriers are Southwest (WN)
and JetBlue (B6). The remaining carriers are defined as Other Carriers (OT ).
III.4 The Model
I consider a model with a discrete choice demand and an oligopolistic airline supply.
Airlines provide a set of differentiated products in each market, and each consumer
either purchases one product or takes the outside option of not flying. In each
market, prices are determined by the Bertrand-Nash competition. Importantly, the
Competition Plan variables are assumed to affect consumer utility and/or carriers
marginal cost.
III.4.1 Demand
The demand model is a random coefficient discrete choice setting in spirit of Berry
et al. (1995). In particular, I follow Berry and Jia (2010) in which there are only
two types of consumers (r =1 or 2) in the air travel market.84 Considering industry
83Similar to the distance measures, I compute the two Layovers as Layoverslong = Layover∗Ilong
and Layovershort = Layover ∗ Ishort.
84Since this model allows random coefficient to have only two values, Berry and Jia (2010) called
it a ‘discrete type’ version of the random coefficient logit model.
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characteristics, we can think two types of passengers as tourist and business travelers.
Especially I allow only three variables to have random coefficients: Price, GateShare
(the average of GateShareOrigin and GateShareDest),85 and Layovers in order to
see whether tourist and business travelers exhibit different level of preference toward
price, the carrier’s gate dominance, and direct flight. For product j in market m,
the utility of consumer i, who is of type r, is given by
uijm = Xjmρ+ δrGateSharejm + ηrLayoversjm + αrpjm + ξjm + νim(λ) + λijm
= xjmβr + αrpjm + ξjm + νim(λ) + λijm (22)
where Xjm is a vector of observed characteristics of product j, including Distance,
Frequency, Slot− control, Tour, Nseat, and carrier dummies
GateSharejm is the average percentage of gates leased to an airline producing
product j in market m,
Layoversjm is the number of total connections round trip of product j,
pjm is the price of product j,
ρ is the vector of tastes for product characteristics,
δr, ηr, αr are, respectively, marginal utility associated with GateSharejm,
Layoversjm, pjm for type r consumers,
ξjm is the unobserved (to econometrician) product characteristic (e.g. product
quality),
νim is a nested logit disturbance that is constant across all inside products in
85This specification has two intentions. First, it reduces the number of coefficients to be estimated.
Second, it can measure aggregate level of consumer conveniences at origin and destination airport.
For example, suppose that a passenger is taking a round trip from Houston to New York by
Continental airline which controls a majority of gates at both airports. Departing from Houston,
she likes better services from gate-dominance by Continental airline. Similarly, this advantage can
also be applied for returning travel from New York.
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market m, but differentiates air travel from the outside option (not flying),
λ is the nested logit parameter,
ijm is an i.i.d. (across products and consumers) logit error,
νim(λ) + λijm follows the Type I extreme value distribution.
The utility from the outside good (e.g. driving a car or taking a train) is given
by
ui0m = ξ0m + i0m. (23)
A simple way to identify mean utility of the outside good is setting it as one of
the inside goods. However, it is not desirable strategy because airline products are
quite different services from other ground transportation services. Alternatively, I
normalize both ξ0m and i0m to be zero for all consumers. In this case, the coefficient
of Constant will measure marginal utility from choosing any airline products.
While all type r consumers are assumed to purchase one unit of good that gives
the highest mean utility (xjmβr + αrpjm + ξjm), the market share of product j is
given by
sjm(xm, pm, ξm, θd) =
2∑
r=1
γr
e(xjmβr+αrpjm+ξjm)/λ
Drm
· D
λ
rm
1 +Dλrm
, (24)
where
Drm =
∑
k∈Jm
e(xkmβr+αrpkm+ξkm)/λ, (25)
xm = (x1m, . . . , xJm), and Jm is the set of all inside products in market m. Notice
that there are only two groups of products in each market (all airline products and
the outside option of not flying), thus the first term of equation (24) denotes within-
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group share of airline product j, and the second one refers to group share of all
the airline products. The set of demand parameters θd includes the taste for the
observed product characteristics βr, the marginal disutility of price αr, the nested
logit parameter λ, and the percentage of type r consumers in the population γr.
I set moment conditions which are the expectations of the unobservable ξjm in-
teracted with exogenous instruments z1. To do so, we need to derive unobservable
ξm as a function of xm, pm, θd, and observed market share ˙sm as follows,
ξm = s
−1(xm, pm, ˙sm, θd). (26)
Technically, this inversion of the market share equation is conducted through the
contraction mapping method by
ξMjm = ξ
M−1
jm + λ[ln ˙sjm − ln sjm(xm, pm, ξm, θd)], (27)
where M denotes the M th iteration, and sjm(xm, pm, ξm, θd) is defined by equation
(24).
Finally, I take price pjm as an endogenous variable in the demand equation, since
it can be correlated with unobservable product quality ξjm. For example, tickets
restricted to Saturday night stay-over, advance purchase, and non-refundable re-
quirement are likely to have cheaper prices than unrestricted tickets. Since I have no
reliable information on these restrictions, an exogenous set of instruments is required
to predict endogenous prices (see section 5).
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III.4.2 Supply
Airline companies are assumed to set optimal multi-product prices according to the
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, given prices and characteristics of competing products,
and the characteristics of their own products.86 Under these assumptions, firm f
chooses pjm to maximize profit:
Πf =
∑
j∈Jfm
(pjm −mcjm)Mmsjm(xm, pm, ξm; θd) (28)
where mcjm is the marginal cost of product j in market m,
Mm is market size,
sjm(·) is the share of product j,
Jfm is the set of all products produced by firm f in market m.
Marginal cost of product j in market m is given by
mcjm = hjmψ + ωjm (29)
where hjm is a vector of observed characteristics of product j,
ψ is a vector of cost parameters to be estimated,
ωjm is an unobserved cost shock.
Note that hjm contains Competition Plan variables such as GateShareOriginjm,
GateShareDestjm, SubleaseOriginm, SubleaseDestm, MiiOriginm, and MiiDestm
as well as other observed cost shifters.
86Ideally, one can set up two-stage game where carriers decide product characteristics (including
Nseat and Frequency) in the first stage, and decide prices in the second stage. This specification
involves a serious computational burden and is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I applied
instrumental variables for the first-stage choice variables. The two-stage oligopoly game has been
extensively addressed in Fan (2013) and Lee (2013).
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Then, any equilibrium price, pjm must satisfy the first-order condition,
sjm(xm, pm, ξm; θd) +
∑
k∈Jfm
(pkm −mckm)∂skm
∂pjm
= 0, for ∀j ∈ Jfm. (30)
Define sfm = [s1m, . . . , sJfm ]
′, pfm = [p1m, . . . , pJfm ]
′, andmcfm = [mc1m, . . . ,mcJfm ]
′,
then in vector notation the first order condition can be written as
sfm(xm, pm, ξm; θd) + ∆(xm, pm, ξm; θd)(pfm −mcfm) = 0, (31)
where ∆(·) is a Jfm × Jfm matrix, given by
∆(xm, pm, ξm; θd) =

∂s1m
∂p1m
· · · ∂sJfm
∂p1m
...
. . .
...
∂s1m
∂pJfm
· · · ∂sJfm
∂pJfm
 . (32)
In order to set moment conditions, I first derive markup equation. By using
equation (31), markup bfm, which is the difference between price and marginal cost,
is defined as
bfm(xm, pm, ξm; θd) = −∆(xm, pm, ξm; θd)−1 · sfm(xm, pm, ξm; θd). (33)
Then, with equation (29), the cost-side unobservable (ωjm) can be obtained,
ωjm = pjm − bjm(xm, pm, ξm; θd)− hjmψ. (34)
Notice that cost-side unobservable ωjm is expressed as a function of price pjm, demand
and cost characteristics (xm, pm, ξm, hjm), and demand and cost parameters (θd, ψ).
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III.5 Empirical Model
III.5.1 Method of Estimation
To get consistent estimates, it would be enough to estimate the demand and cost
parameters separately. However, I consider that a set of demand parameters θd en-
ters not only ξjm but also ωjm through the market share function. This interrelation
creates an incentive to jointly estimate them for an enhancement of efficiency. I
estimate the system of equations by using a two-stage nonlinear GMM method. Let
Z = [z1 z2] be a set of instruments for the endogenous variables in demand and
marginal cost, respectively. As an identification assumption, I set the moment con-
ditions by taking expectations of each structural error interacted with the exogenous
instruments
∀j,m :
E[z′1jmξjm(θd)] = 0,
E[z′2jmωjm(θd, ψ)] = 0. (35)
Let g(Θ) be the stacked vector of sample analogues to the moments (14), where
Θ = [θd ψ]. I minimize the first-stage objective function Q = g(Θ)
′V g(Θ) with a
weighting matrix V = (Z ′Z)−1, assuming all error terms are homoscedastic. After
obtaining parameter estimates Θ̂1, I estimate the structural errors τˆ = [ξˆ ωˆ] to
compute optimal weighting matrix V = (Z ′τˆ τˆ ′Z)−1 for second stage. The objective
function is minimized once again to produce the final parameter estimates Θ̂2.
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III.5.2 Instruments and Identification
Before airlines choose fares, they know the unobserved (to econometricians) product
quality ξ and the unobserved cost shock ω. Hence, the choice variables are likely to
be correlated with the structural errors. For the endogenous prices, I applied four
groups of instrumental variables.
First of all, I use the number of routes within a market as market characteristics.
This factor can represent the degree of competition in a market which can affect
overall price level.
The second group of instruments includes the number of cities directly connected
from origin and destination airport, respectively. These airport characteristics mea-
sure the aggregate network size of all carriers serving an airport which can be related
to price level at the airport. I also include dummies for arriving at and transferring
at hub airport in the sense that cost can be affected by hub operation.
Further, following Berry and Jia (2010), the 25th and the 75th quantile of fitted
fares are included. These measures can better capture the price dispersion87 which
has been commonly observed in airline industry. To obtain the fitted fares, I regressed
ticket fares on carrier dummy, market level characteristics (distance, tourist places,
market size), and a carrier’s share at origin and destination city.
The last group of instruments contains the exogenous variables that directly enter
the market share equation and the marginal cost equation.
To handle the potential endogeneity of Nseat and Frequency, I apply several
carrier, route, and market characteristics. They include a carrier’s percentage of
flights originated from hub airports, percentage of flights terminated at hub airports,
the number of cities that a carrier flies nonstop from origin and destination airport,
87This issue was exhaustively analyzed in Borenstein and Rose (1994, 2007)
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and the number of routes within a market.
The random coefficient model in demand side will produce two sets of parameter
estimates for Price, GateShare, and Layovers. Then how do we identify two types
of passengers in air travel market? In brief, the data cannot identify two types of
consumers. The identification comes from the substitution pattern among similar
products. Let’s consider price-product share plot in figure 11. Given market and
distance, on average, high priced tickets will be purchased by consumers who do not
care much about price (business travelers), and thus a price increase in high priced
products may have small effect on demand. On the other hand, low-priced products
are likely to be purchased by price sensitive consumers (tourist travelers) so that a
price change can have large effect on the demand. Based on this substitution pattern,
the model fits this sort of data by estimating two coefficients.
III.6 Result
I report results from the reduced form pricing equation first, and then present pa-
rameter estimates from the structural model. The marginal cost and profit estimates
will be discussed next. Finally, I propose a counterfactual analysis examining how
the conversion of exclusive gates to commonly available gates at airports will affect
carriers’ marginal cost, fare, and profits.
III.6.1 Reduced Form Pricing Equation
One of the key questions of this paper is whether three contractual clauses are crucial
determinants of the hub premium. To examine the hypothesis, I regress round-trip
ticket fares on hub variables, Competition Plan variables, and other control variables.
In the first column in table 20, we can see unconditional hub premium (without
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controlling Competition Plan variables). The variables HubOrigin and HubDest are
indicator variables (1 if origin and destination airport, respectively, is a carrier’s hub).
The coefficient of HubOrigin (HubDest) is 0.885 (0.566), implying that hub carriers
charge $88.5 ($56.6) as extra premiums for flights departing from (arriving at) their
hub airports. Consistent with previous studies (Borenstein, 1989), the result points
out that there exists significant hub premium with greater effect at origin airports.
Next, to address main issue, I include Competition Plan variables in the next
two columns. In the second column, the coefficient of GateShareOrigin has sig-
nificantly positive value of 1.929, implying that a 5 percent increase in the gate
occupancy at origin airport would lead to $9.6 increase in the airline’s overall prices:
0.05 × 1.929 × 100. The similar argument is available for GateShareDest. The ex-
istence of sublease agreement increases the overall prices by $19.3 ($34.7) at origin
(destination) airports. The allowance of MII power also increases ticket fares by
$12.7 at destination airports.
Finally, I include both hub and Competition Plan variables in the third col-
umn. We can see that conditional on Competition Plan variables, hub premium
becomes quite smaller compared to the unconditional hub premium. The coefficient
of HubOrigin is now 0.450, down from 0.885 (49.2 percent decrease), and that of
HubDest is 0.291, down from 0.566 (48.6 percent decrease). The result suggests
that nearly 50% of hub effect comes from signatory carriers’ gate dominance and
associated contractual practices.88 Considering possible endogeneity of Nseat and
Frequency, similar specifications are estimated by IV regressions. In overall, the
results (in column 4 through 6) do not show much difference compared to OLS esti-
mates in terms of their magnitudes and signs.
88In a different way, I regressed ticket fares on hub variables to get predicted value, and then
regressed the predicted value on Competition Plan variables. Adj.R-sq. was about 50% again.
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However, these parameter estimates should be interpreted with caution. Since
all estimates are derived from reduced form specifications, they represent ‘net ef-
fect’ of the variables on demand and supply side. For example, if a major car-
rier’s gate-dominance allows significant market power by shifting demand upward,
GateShareOrigin (GateShareDest) is likely to increases fares. On the other hand,
if gate dominance can reduce its marginal cost through operational advantages over
other carriers, ticket prices can decrease. Thus, the coefficients of GateShareOrigin
and GateShareDest represent the overall magnitude of two opposite effects on de-
mand and supply side. The decomposition of these separate effects, which is the
main goal of this study, is done by structural analysis in the following section.
III.6.2 Structural Analysis
III.6.2.1 Demand parameters
The first column in table 21 presents demand parameter estimates from structural
estimation. Most parameters are precisely estimated. First, the price parameters are
identified by the variation of product shares in response to the changes in prices. The
coefficients of type 1 and type 2 passengers are -0.639 and -0.077, respectively. While
different types of passengers are expected to exhibit differing price sensitivity, and
type 1 travelers exhibit 8.3 times as much price sensitivity as type 2 group. Based
on industry knowledge, type 1 passengers (with high disutility of price) represent the
tourist group.89
Consistent with the hypothesis that a consumer’s utility increases with a carrier’s
gate share, the coefficients for both tourists (GateShare1) and business passengers
89In Berry and Jia (2010), estimates of price parameters were -0.78 and -0.07 for tourist and
business passengers, respectively (using 1999 data). Berry et al. (2006) reported 0.696 and 0.068
for tourist and business travelers, respectively (using 1985 data). Thus, my estimates are quite
close to them.
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(GateShare2) are significantly positive, and business travelers exhibit stronger pref-
erences (0.917) than tourists (0.580). Comparing Willingness to Pay (WTP) for gate
by dividing coefficients of GateShare1 and GateShare2 by price coefficient of each
type, business travelers have thirteen times higher WTP ( δ2
α2
/ δ1
α1
= 13.1). The result
supports that better services from more gates satisfy consumers who want conve-
nience. Furthermore, the extensive airline network associated with control of a large
fraction of gates can hold more appeal for business passengers.
The coefficients of Layovers1 and Layovers2 are -0.436 and -0.572, respectively,
indicating that connecting flights generate disutility to both groups. While taking
connecting flights, passengers go through an additional stopover, movement to the
next departure gate, and boarding. This connection process makes their travels not
as smooth as flying on direct flights. In terms of WTP, the business group exhibits
about eleven times higher WTP than tourist group does: η2
α2
/ η1
α1
= 10.9.
All other demand parameters have the expected signs. lnDistance has a sig-
nificantly positive coefficient, 0.212. In short-haul markets, air transportation ser-
vices are competing with other transportation modes such as cars, buses, or trains.
However, as a traveling distance increases, the substitutability to the outside goods
becomes worse so that demand for air travel can grow.
Frequency is expected to capture two things. First, high flight frequency repre-
sents the carrier’s presence at the airport, which can be correlated with the carrier’s
gate dominance. Thus control of frequency can deal with the omitted variable bias
problem associated with GateShare. Second, high frequency can benefit consumers
by reducing schedule delay and by allowing frequent departures at more convenient
times (Brueckner, 2002), thus consumers’ utilities are likely to increase in flight fre-
quency. The parameter estimates is 0.054.
The coefficient of Slot − control is -0.074. Slot-controlled airports are more
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congested due to high traffic, and passengers regard travels through crowded airports
as unpleasant factor. As shown in many previous studies, the tendency that tourist
places attract more consumers is supported by the coefficient of Tour, 0.266. By
using the number of seats as a proxy, I controlled aircraft size in order to catch
overall capacity effect. The estimated coefficient was 0.382. As Wei and Hansen
(2005) suggested, this positive effect comes from greater perceived safety, higher
amenity levels, and slightly higher cruise speeds of larger planes.
Carrier dummies, which represent the effects of unobservable firm specific char-
acteristics (for example, brand loyalty), produce reasonable signs and magnitudes.
The coefficients imply that consumers exhibit strong preferences for low-cost carriers
(LCCs). The coefficients of JetBlue and Southwest are 0.529 and 0.062, respectively.
Flights out of fringe airports, online booking, and provision of just-necessary level
of onboard services can keep LCCs’ prices down. Considering that price-sensitive
tourist passengers take about 87% of consumers in population (γ = 0.873), strong
preferences for LCCs make sense. Finally, the degree of product differentiation be-
tween within-group products (λ) is 0.728. If λ is equal to 0, the within-group products
become perfectly substitutable, thus the estimate 0.728 implies that there exists a
mild substitution chance among airline products.
III.6.2.2 Cost parameters
Marginal cost parameters are estimated by regressing the difference between prod-
uct price and the estimated markup on several cost characteristics. The results are
reported in the second column in table 21. Starting with carriers’ gate occupancy,
I find the coefficient of GateShareOrigin to be negative (-0.504) at the 10% signif-
icance level. The magnitude of the parameter can be interpreted as follows. A five
percent increase in the gates leased at origin airport would lead to $2.5 reduction in
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an airline’s marginal cost: 0.05 × (−0.504) × 100. As section 2 described, the cost
reduction can be realized from a lower price charged to the signatory airlines for the
use of the airport’s facilities, the reduction of transaction costs, or the utilization of
economies of traffic density. However, the cost reduction is not found at destination
airports.
Next, coefficients of both SubleaseOrigin and SubleaseDest are significantly
positive, 0.094 and 0.123, respectively. The coefficient of SubleaseOrigin implies that
the presence of a sublease agreement at the origin airport raises carriers’ marginal cost
by $9.4: 1×0.094×100. Notably, the data do not tell whether an individual carrier is
sub-tenant airline or not: SubleaseOrigin and SubleaseDest are not carrier specific
variables but airport characteristics. However, considering that new entrant carriers
lease gates directly from signatory carriers without airport authorities’ intervention
on sublease fee-setting, the cost increase can be mostly borne by sub-tenant carriers
(This argument will be tested in section 6.3). With regard to MII clauses, the
coefficients are not significant.
Other cost parameters are precisely estimated with the expected signs. The
coefficients of distance are 0.213 and 0.122 respectively for short and long-haul routes,
implying that as market distance is longer, the cost of carrying one more passenger
rises and that marginal cost is lower on long-haul routes due to higher fuel efficiency.
The coefficient for Layovers represents two countervailing effects (as described in
section 3.2). The positive estimates of Layovers−short and Layovers−long suggest
that fuel consumptions for an extra take-off and landing surpass the cost advantage
from higher load factors. Understandably, the two LCCs, JetBlue and Southwest,
have lower marginal costs than the legacy carriers.
Ciliberto and Williams (2010) considered that the effect of carrier’s gate domi-
nance on hub premium can be stronger at congested airports where gates are scarce
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resource. This is possible because the expected shadow cost of obtaining a gate at
congested airports can be high for a new entrant than other airports. In order to
maintain close relation between their reduced-form approach and my structural anal-
ysis, I also create the airport congestion variable and interact it with all Competition
Plan variables.90 The results are reported in the table 22.
Starting with gate-occupancy, I find significantly negative effects. Coefficients
of the two variables, GateShareOrigin ∗ CongestedOrigin and GateShareDest ∗
CongestedDest, are -0.266 and -0.254, respectively. Surprisingly, the effects of the
primary variables GateShareOrigin and GateShareDest become insignificant. This
result suggests that controlling a large fraction of gates reduces carriers’ costs only
at congested airport. The estimate of -0.266 at origin airport indicates that 5%
increase in gate control leads to $1.33 reduction in the carrier’s marginal cost at
origin airports where congestion levels are one standard deviation higher than the
mean airport: 0.05× (−0.266)× 1× 100.91
MII clauses, which had no effect in table 21, become highly significant and positive
when airports are congested. The coefficients of interaction terms are 0.14 and 0.21
for MiiOrigin∗CongestedOrigin and MiiDest∗CongestedDest, respectively. The
estimate of 0.14 at the origin airport implies that the provision of MII power is
likely to increase carriers’ marginal cost by $14 at origin airport with one standard
deviation higher congestion: 1 × (0.14) × 1 × 100. As described in section 2.3, the
coefficients of MII clauses are expected to represent the effects of two factors: cost
increases from paying for airport operating expenses and cost decreases from blocking
additional airport projects paid for by MII carriers. The positive signs imply that
90CongestedOrigin is calculated by the ratio of average daily departures performed (by all car-
riers) out of an origin airport in a given quarter over the total number of gates at the airport. Also
CongestedDest is created for destination airport. Average daily departures and total number of
gates are calculated by using T-100 dataset and Competition Plans, respectively.
91For the convenient interpretation, congestion measure was standard normalized: N(0, 1).
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the former effect is larger.
The results support that Competition Plan variables significantly affect carriers’
marginal cost especially at congested airports. Signatory carriers can exploit cost
advantages from increased gate occupancy, but must take financial responsibility as-
sociated with MII clauses in exchange for creating a barrier to entry. Non-signatory
airlines have to cope with cost disadvantages from sublease agreements. Other vari-
ables in table 22 have very similar estimates to those in table 21 at high significance
level.
III.6.2.3 Other specifications
The reduced form estimation (section 6.1) shows that a large portion of the hub pre-
mium comes from the carrier’s gate dominance and associated contractual practices.
Then, will this be valid again in a structural framework? That is, will consumers’
valuation for hub carrier largely depend on carriers’ gate control? I examine this
issue by estimating modified specifications reported in table 23. In the first column,
I drop GateShare1 and GateShare2, and include HubDM1 and HubDM2.92 As
expected, both types of passengers exhibit strong preferences for hub carriers at ori-
gin and/or destination airport. The coefficients are 0.172 for tourists and 0.137 for
business travelers. In the second column, I control GateShare with other variables
unchanged. Interestingly, the coefficient of HubDM1 decreases by 65 percent (0.061
from 0.172), the coefficient of HubDM2 becomes statistically insignificant, while
the coefficient of GateShare is significantly positive with a reasonable magnitude.
The results confirm that carrier’s gate dominance is a critical source of consumers’
preference for hub carrier.
In order to check the robustness of the findings, five other specifications are
92HubDM is defined as HubOrigin+HubDest.
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estimated as in table 24. One might argue that the positive effect of GateShare
on consumers’ utility could be driven by the differentiation of some other services
between major and small carriers. To address this concern, the first column restricts
the sample to markets longer than 3,000 miles, which exceed the range of most small
carriers. This restriction excludes about 58 percent of products and 37 percent of
markets. The result shows that gate occupancy still increases passengers utility for
both types, and that business travelers exhibit stronger preference again in terms of
both marginal valuation and WTP for gate.
Similarly, the findings may represent a carrier’s monopoly power, thus it may
be valid only for monopoly markets. For example, when a carrier dominates an
extremely high percentage of gates and passenger enplanements, consumers do not
have little choice but to buy the monopoly carrier’s products. To determine if this
is the case, the second column includes only non-monopoly markets where multiple
carriers serve. Once again, the result indicates that consumers’ preferences for gate
remain significant.
Next, I examine whether the bin size affects the results. Column 3 and 4 present
estimates with finer and rougher set of bins, respectively.93 In both cases, while the
main findings still stand, tourist travelers show somewhat stronger preference for
gate occupancy than the base specification in table 22.
Finally, some variation in the years of Competition Plans may weaken the finding.
Considering it, the last column uses Competition Plans submitted only in 2004. The
coefficient of GateShare2 was in great decline, but it did not hurt main results.
Regarding cost parameters, all specifications support the key findings in supply
93In column 3, the set of bins were $10 for tickets under $200, $15 for tickets between $200 and
$400, $20 for tickets between $400 and $700, $50 for tickets between $700 and $1,000, $100 for
tickets above $1,000. In column 4, the bins were $50 for tickets under $700, $70 for tickets between
$700 and $1,000, $100 for tickets above $1,000.
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side. High gate occupancy create cost advantages to signatory carriers at congested
airport, and the presence of sublease agreement and MII clauses at congested airport
force non-signatory and signatory airlines, respectively, to endure cost increase.
III.6.2.4 Price and gate elasticities
In the nested logit model, the coefficients do not provide a direct economic interpre-
tation. To better understand their magnitudes, I calculated elasticities with respect
to price and gate-occupancy in table 25. In the first column, price elasticities of
type1 and type2 are -3.99 and -0.50, respectively. It tells that one percent increase
in ticket prices tends to decrease demand of tourist and business travelers by four
percent and half a percent, respectively. For tourists, the average elasticity is -3.49
with a range from -2.05 to -4.09 over different specifications. And the aggregate price
elasticity -2.37 tells that the total demand decrease by about 2.4% in response to 1%
increase in prices.94
The effect of gate occupancy on demand appears to be moderate. The estimated
gate elasticity indicates that one percent increase in the number of gates controlled
by each carrier raises demand by 0.13% for tourists and 0.14% for business travelers.
These elasticities do not vary much across specifications.
III.6.3 Marginal Cost and Profit Estimates
By using parameter estimates (θˆd, ψˆ), observed characteristics (x, h), and the es-
timates of unobserved factors (ξˆ, ωˆ), I calculated marginal costs, markups, and
94When calculating aggregate elasticities, I estimated the percentage of passengers who actually
bought the tickets. It is defined by using γ and group share of all inside products: the percentage
of type 1 passengers = γ1 · D
λ
1m
1+Dλ1m
/
∑2
r=1 γr · D
λ
rm
1+Dλrm
, where Dλrm is defined by equation (25). The
bottom panel in table 25 reports that 54% of passengers are tourist travelers for the base case.
The proportions are consistent with the results of Berry and Jia (2010) which reported that tourist
travelers accounted for from 47% to 64% over several specifications.
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profits. Throughout this analysis, I focus on flights originating from congested air-
ports. Table 26 and 27, respectively, report the estimates at the airports where
CongestedOrigin > 0 and CongestedOrigin > 1. Starting with marginal cost in
the top panel of table 26, signatory carriers appear to take advantage of a lower
marginal cost ($82) on average, compared to non-signatory carriers ($94).95 In sec-
tion 2.2 and 6.2, I explained that the cost increase from sublease agreement would be
mostly borne by sub-tenant carriers. The second panel supports the argument. We
can see that non-signatory carrier’s costs increase to $96 at airports with sublease
agreement relative to that in the first panel, whereas costs of signatory carrier do
not. Note that a group of sub-tenant carriers is a subset of non-signatory carriers.
Also I explained that the positive coefficient of MII clauses indicated increases in
signatory carriers’ costs from paying for airport operating expense. Indeed, the third
panel shows that signatory carriers’ costs rise to $85 at the airports with MII clauses,
whereas non-signatory carriers’ costs do not.
The last panel shows average marginal cost by carriers. Two LCCs (Jet Blue
and Southwest) reasonably have lower costs ($58 and $50, respectively), and legacy
carriers exhibit considerable variation. Continental (CO) and United airline (UA)
exhibit high costs, and Northwest (NW) pays relatively low costs. As one possible
explanation, CO and UA largely depend on connecting flights compared to NW.
In the sample, connecting flights count for 53% of products by all carriers, but the
proportion is 63% for CO and 65% for UA, but only 39% for NW. Considering that
cost increases from connections surpass the scale economies, higher costs borne by
CO and UA make sense. In overall, the average marginal cost for each product is
$87, and the Lerner index, the ratio of markups to fares is around 0.81.
In column 4-6, I report quantity, profits, and revenues which are average measures
95An airline is assumed to be a signatory carrier if GateShareOriginkm > 0.
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per market, instead of per product. As the top panel shows, signatory carriers earn
higher profits than non-signatory airlines. The profit ratio between two groups is
around 2.56 where the ratio is defined as Profitsig/Profitnon−sig. The profitability of
signatory airline comes from higher fares, lower costs, and larger passenger enplane-
ments. At airports where sublease agreements exist, the profit ratio goes up to 2.70.
A closer look reveals that the additional profit differential mainly comes from bigger
gap in marginal cost and quantity across carrier group. However, at airports with
MII clauses, the profit ratio (2.53) is almost the same to the top panel. In this case,
increase in price differentials and decrease in marginal cost and quantity cancel each
other out. The table 27 presents the same analysis by focusing on more congested
airports where CongestedOrigin > 1 and shows very similar pattern to table 26.
III.6.4 Counterfactual Analysis
AIR-21 has recommended the targeted airports to reduce the portion of exclusive
or preferential gates for promoting broader access to gates. Even though the act
does not carry legal binding force, the covered airports have actually reduced the
portion to stay eligible for collecting passenger facility charges (PFCs).96 Motivated
by the intent of AIR-21, I performs a hypothetical analysis to examine how the
limits on gate agreements can affect fares, costs, and profits of signatory and other
carriers. Suppose that federal government put a ceiling of 75% on the proportion
of exclusive gates at an airport, then airports where more than 75% of gates are
leased exclusively (e.g. Dallas/Fort Worth, Newark, etc.) should take some gates
from signatory carriers and make them common gates. The lower a ceiling is, the
more carriers would have to give up their gates. I simulate three counter-factual
96Under AIR-21, airports can charge up to $4.50 for each passenger via ticket she purchases, and
the collected fees become an important source of funding for airport capital investment.
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scenarios with a ceiling of 75%, 50%, and 25%, respectively. The number of airports
and signatory carriers affected by each scenario is summarized by table 28.
According to each scenario, GateShare, GateShareOrigin, and GateShareDest
are changed, and then I simulated a new vector of equilibrium prices (p∗fm) which
satisfy the first order condition below,
p∗fm = m̂c
post
fm −∆(xpostm , p∗m, ξˆm; θˆd)−1 · sfm(xpostm , p∗m, ξˆm; θˆd) (36)
where m̂cpostfm is marginal costs estimates obtained by using post-regulation prod-
uct characteristics (GateShareOriginpostm , GateShareDest
post
m ), the unobserved cost
shock (ωˆfm), and cost estimates (ψˆ).
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The results are presented in table 29 and 30. The effects of counterfactual regu-
lation at airports where CongestedOrigin > 0 are identified by comparing the top
panel in table 26 with the first three panels in table 29. Under the first scenario
of 75% ceiling, new optimal prices and costs of signatory carriers appear to slightly
change. Reducing exclusive gates increase signatory carrier’s marginal costs by $2
and fares by $1. Since only 9.5 gates from 2.7 carriers become common gates, the
regulation has tenuous effects on supply side. However, demand side is influenced to
a greater extent. Since higher fares and lower gate occupancy drop passengers’ mean
utility, the passenger enplanements decrease by 7%. In overall, signatory carriers’
profits and revenues will decrease by 6%. Fare and marginal cost of non-signatory car-
97To make the analysis feasible, equation (36) makes several nontrivial assumptions. First, it
assumes demand and cost estimates remain the same before and after the regulation. One concern
is that passengers’ marginal utilities of gates are changeable. The number of gates controlled by a
carrier is closely related to the airline network size, thus the overall reduction in exclusive gates can
depreciate potential benefits from frequent flier programs in aviation market. If true, my estimates
would overestimate the impact on demand. However, when signatory carriers make up gates (as
many as they lose) from common gates available, the assumption will be justified. Second, I assume
that unobserved product quality (ξˆ) and cost shock (ωˆ) stay the same. These factors (e.g. ticket
restrictions, oil price, the level of advertising, etc) are not likely to significantly interact with the
level of gate occupancy.
84
riers remain almost the same because they do not control any gates to be converted.
Notable thing is that their quantities and profits slightly decrease. To understand
it, I cautiously compared predicted market shares before and after the regulation
and found that within-group shares ( e
(xjmβr+αrpjm+ξjm)/λ
Drm
) of non-signatory carriers
actually increased. However, group share of all inside products ( D
λ
rm
1+Dλrm
) appears to
significantly decrease. It suggests that gate reduction not only decreases demand for
signatory carriers, but reduces total air travel demand.
While the second and third scenarios produce similar patterns, the magnitudes of
the effect get stronger. Putting 50% ceiling drives up signatory carrier’s costs by $7
and fares by $19. In demand side, decrease in passengers’ mean utility reduces quan-
tities by 15% and profits by 14%.98 Under 25% ceiling, there becomes no difference
in marginal cost between two groups of carriers, implying that cost advantage by
signatory carrier completely disappears. The effects of regulation at airports where
CongestedOrigin > 1 become much greater for each scenario. Comparison between
table 27 and 30 shows that cost advantage by signatory carriers almost vanishes even
under 75% ceiling.
Even though the counterfactual analysis reasonably predicts how costs and prof-
its change, it leaves much room for improvement. The analysis does not consider the
possibility that new carriers enter the airports when more common gates are avail-
able. If this entry-exit decision is incorporated with appropriate model and data,
competitive effect of the regulation can be better predicted.
98The data indicate that each airport has about 7 signatory carriers on average, so cap of 50%
would affect half of all signatory airlines.
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III.7 Conclusion
Since the airline industry was deregulated, questions have continued to be brought up
as to whether airline rivalry is as vigorous as expected. This concern has been sup-
ported by several government reports and academic studies identifying the existence
and robustness of the hub premium. However, there have been limited studies iden-
tifying the feasible sources of the premium. In this study, I show that the major car-
riers’ market power is largely based on their contractual relationships with airports.
Unlike Ciliberto and Williams (2010) who addresses this issue with reduced-from
approach, I work with a structural model to quantify the effects of the gate contracts
on consumer utility and carriers’ marginal cost separately. Using the data from the
U.S. Department of Transportation, I estimate the demand and supply parameters
and then simulate the effects of counterfactual regulation on prices, marginal costs,
and profits.
Main findings suggest that in demand side, a signatory carrier’s gate dominance
has positive effect on passengers utility. Especially, business travelers have thirteen
times higher WTP for gate than tourist travelers, mainly because the extensive airline
network based on the gate occupancy can hold more appeal for business travelers.
In supply side, the control of large fraction of gates contributes to the reduction of
signatory carriers’ marginal costs. A five percent increase in the gates leased at the
origin airport leads to $2.5 reduction in the airline’s marginal cost.
Furthermore, the existence of sublease agreement at an airport tends to raise
non-signatory carriers’ marginal cost, whereas MII provision at an airport is likely to
increase signatory carriers’ marginal cost. For sublease agreement and MII clauses,
the parameter estimates may not provide such direct interpretations since two vari-
ables are measured at the airport level, but the subsequent marginal cost estimates
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reasonably support the explanation. Importantly, these cost effects become more
significant and stronger at congested airports. Finally, the counterfactual analysis
implies that the limits on gate agreements not only reduce the cost differentials be-
tween signatory and non-signatory airlines but decrease signatory carriers’ passenger
enplanements due to their higher fares and lower gate occupancy.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
This dissertation examines how horizontal merger between airline companies and
vertical contract between airlines and airports affect market competition. Using an
empirical structural model, I identify the effects of the collaborative strategies on
both demand and supply, and derive welfare implications.
In Chapter II, I show that when a merger simulation ignores changes in product
characteristics post-merger, the predicted prices and welfare effects can be substan-
tially biased. I overcome the limitations by endogenizing both price and product
characteristics in a two-stage oligopoly game.
Based on the estimation of airline demand and supply system, and simulation
for the Delta and Northwest Airlines merger, I find that the merged carrier tends
to increase product differentiation post-merger by raising the quality of the primary
(large and medium) goods, but by reducing that of the secondary (small) goods.
Since the primary goods are more profitable, the merged firm takes better care of
their qualities to attract more passengers to them.
Second, the higher differentiation affects the merged carrier’s ability of raising
prices. For primary goods, the full model predicts smaller cross-price effects than
the price model. But for secondary goods, the cross-price effect is greater in the full
model.
Third, endogenizing product characteristics leads to significantly different welfare
implications. The price model predicts decrease in consumer welfare for both types
of passengers, but the full model predicts that the business passengers get welfare
gains from the merger and the tourists also experience smaller losses. This causes
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an overall increase in consumer welfare.
Finally, when merger simulation considers endogeneity of product characteristics,
it can better predict actual post-merger outcome. In Quality-Increased markets,
the simulated and actual post-merger frequency increase from pre-merger frequency.
In Quality-Decreased markets, on the other hand, they decrease from pre-merger
one. For both groups of markets, the probability density function of the simulated
frequency is located between those of pre-merger and actual post-merger frequency.
In Chapter III, I identify the effects of vertical contracts regarding gates on de-
mand and supply. Initially, I estimate a pricing equation which is similar to Cilib-
erto and Williams (2010), and then deepen the analysis with structural estimation.
Moreover, I facilitate the advantage of the structural approach to examine how hy-
pothetical regulations affect carriers’ fares, costs, and profits.
Main findings suggest that a signatory carrier’s gate dominance has positive effect
on passengers utility on the demand side. Especially, business travelers have thirteen
times higher WTP for gate than tourist travelers. On the supply side, the control
of large fraction of gates contributes to reducing signatory carriers’ marginal costs.
Furthermore, the existence of sublease agreement at an airport tends to raise non-
signatory carriers’ marginal cost, whereas MII provision at an airport is likely to
increase signatory carriers’ marginal cost.
This paper concludes with three notes for future research. Regarding Chapter II,
the comparison analysis suggests that simulated result still under- or overestimates
the actual post-merger outcome. The insufficient performance possibly comes from
ignoring a change in unobserved product quality post-merger. If the link between
unobserved and observed characteristics can be modeled through either structural or
reduced form method, it can further improve the predictive performance of merger
simulation.
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About Chapter III, I do not model carriers’ gate-occupying decisions, assum-
ing that gate allocation is exogenously given. In a long-term perspective, however,
carriers can decide how many gates should be controlled to maximize profits and
to optimize their network structure. Financial obligations associated with the gate
agreements and legislative restriction such as AIR-21 will significantly affect the
decisions. I leave this subsequent question for future research.
Finally, for both studies, I modeled the consumer heterogeneity with two types
of passengers and estimated the percentage of each type in the population (γr). An
interesting point is that the distribution of the consumers can vary from market to
market. For example, the Houston to Las Vegas market may have a higher proportion
of the tourists to the business passengers than the Las Vegas to Houston market.
Responding to these distributions, a carrier can choose different product offerings for
each market. The relationship between the distribution of consumer types and firm’
decisions on product offerings can be an interesting topic for future research.
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APPENDIX
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Data Sources
Database Variables Level of obs. Sample periods
O&D Survey (DB1B)
Market, Product,
Fare, Controls
ticket ‘07.2Q.∼‘08.1Q.
On-Time Performance Ontime15 carrier-route ‘07.Apr.∼‘08.Mar.
T-100 Domestic Segment Frequency carrier-route ‘07.Apr.∼‘08.Mar.
Air Travel Consumer Report
Mishandled baggage,
Denied boarding
carrier ‘07.Apr.∼‘08.Mar.
Air Carrier Financial Report Employee statistics carrier ‘07
Weather Underground Wind, Rain, Snow airport ‘07.Apr.∼‘08.Mar.
MSA Population Market size MSA city ‘07 estimates
Notes: Controls include Layovers, Distance, HubDM, hubMC, Slot-control, Tour, Carrier dummies.
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Table 2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Estimation Sample
Variable Description Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Endogenous variables
Fare Average ticket fare ($100) 3.74 1.13 0.55 13.17
Ontime15 Percentage of flights that arrive less than 15 min-
utes late
0.75 0.08 0 1
Frequency No. of average daily departures per quarter 4.32 2.42 0.01 26.18
Mishandled baggage No. of mishandled baggages per 1,000 passengers 6.44 1.73 2.61 13.52
Denied boarding No. of involuntary denied boardings per 10,000
passengers
1.19 0.72 0.01 4.48
Control variables
Layovers No. of connections per round trip 1.67 0.75 0 2
Distance Market distance round trip (1,000 miles) 3.18 1.43 0.22 6.94
HubDM No. of hub airports given carrier and itinerary 0.72 0.60 0 3
HubMC 1 if a flight departs from, connects at, or arrives
at hub
0.64 0.48 0 1
Slot-control No. of slot-controlled airports on itinerary 0.28 0.59 0 3
Tour 1 if destination airport is in either CA, FL, or NV 0.32 0.47 0 1
Carrier dummies
AA 1 if a carrier is American Airlines 0.13 0.34 0 1
CO 1 if a carrier is Continental Airlines 0.07 0.25 0 1
DL 1 if a carrier is Delta Airlines 0.14 0.35 0 1
NW 1 if a carrier is Northwest Airlines 0.10 0.30 0 1
UA 1 if a carrier is United Airlines 0.10 0.30 0 1
US 1 if a carrier is US Airways 0.11 0.32 0 1
FL 1 if a carrier is AirTran Airways 0.05 0.22 0 1
WN 1 if a carrier is Southwest Airlines 0.17 0.38 0 1
OT 1 if a carrier is other carrier 0.13 0.33 0 1
Notes: The sample contains 87,906 unique products in 9,117 markets. Sample period is from ‘07. 2Q.
through ‘08. 1Q.
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Table 3. Instrumental Variables for Endogenous Product Characteristics
Instruments Ontime15 Frequency
Mishandled
Baggage
Denied
Boarding
Weather (wind, rain, snow) Yes Yes Yes –
Carrier’s Hub Status
Hub Origin Yes Yes – Yes
Hub Connection Yes Yes Yes –
Hub Destination – Yes – –
Labor Category (%)
General Managers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pilots & Copilots – Yes – –
Passenger Svc. & Admin. – – Yes Yes
Maintenance Yes – – –
Aircraft Traffic Handling – Yes – –
Aircraft Control Yes Yes – –
Passenger Handling – – – Yes
Cargo Handling – – Yes –
Statistical – – – Yes
Traffic Soliciters – Yes – Yes
Validity of instruments
F-statistics 724.5 806.6 1,600.5 2,903.6
R-squared 0.083 0.114 0.154 0.284
Notes: The weather data come from Weather Underground which gathers its most information
from the National Weather Service (NWS). I used information on wind, rain, and snow condition
at origin and destination airport. The employment data come from Air Carrier Financial
Reports (Schedule P-10).
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Table 4. Estimation Results on Model Parameters
Mean Utility Marginal Cost ($100)
Endogenous Characteristics Frequency -0.021** (0.002)
Fare1 -0.098** (0.004) HubMC -0.184** (0.017)
Fare2 -0.999** (0.019) Layoversshort 0.175** (0.010)
Ontime151 1.641** (0.164) Layoverslong 0.300** (0.019)
Ontime152 2.114** (0.155) Distanceshort 0.226** (0.005)
Frequency 0.084** (0.003) Distancelong 0.130** (0.004)
Mishandled baggage -0.054** (0.005) US -0.036** (0.008)
Denied boardings -0.253** (0.018) DL -0.168** (0.011)
NW -0.289** (0.012)
Controls UA -0.010 (0.008)
Layovers1 -1.255** (0.013) CO -0.015 (0.010)
Layovers2 -1.085** (0.009) FL -0.559** (0.019)
Distance 0.105** (0.005) WN -0.223** (0.018)
HubDM 0.056** (0.010) OT -0.190** (0.016)
Slot-control -0.071** (0.006) Constant 1.721** (0.029)
Tour 0.238** (0.006)
US 0.143** (0.014) Slope of Fixed Cost ($100)
DL 0.007 (0.027) Ontime15constant 2416.8** (0.742)
NW -0.511** (0.019) Ontime15 -2970.2** (0.518)
UA 0.124** (0.017) Frequencyconstant 6.605** (0.064)
CO -0.119** (0.024) Frequency 0.224** (0.005)
FL -0.875** (0.020) Mishandled baggageconstant -8.126** (0.059)
WN -0.329** (0.021) Mishandled baggage 0.491** (0.005)
OT -0.023 (0.017) Denied boardingconstant -31.634** (0.148)
Constant -7.184** (0.130) Denied boarding 7.005** (0.020)
λ 0.618** (0.003)
γ1 0.052** (0.004) Number of observations: 87,906
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates 99% level of significance. Subscript 1
and 2 attached to Fare, Ontime15, and Layovers indicate consumer types.
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Table 5. Operating Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM, in cents)
2Q 2007 3Q 2007 4Q 2007 1Q 2008 Average
(By carrier)
US∗ 16.3 15.8 16.4 17 16.4
DL∗ 14.3 14 15.2 16.5 15.0
NW∗ 13 13.6 14.7 16 14.3
UA 13 13.3 14.6 14.9 14.0
CO 13.5 13.5 14 14.9 14.0
AA∗ 12.8 13.1 13.7 14.4 13.5
FL∗ 9.4 9.5 9.9 10.9 9.9
WN∗ 9 9.1 9.4 9.7 9.3
(By carrier type)
Legacy carriers 13.4 13.6 14.5 15.3 14.2
LCC carriers 9.6 9.6 9.5 10 9.7
Notes: Data sources of CASM are Air Carrier Financial Statistics
(Schedule P-12) and T-100 Domestic Segment from U.S. DOT. The as-
terisk indicates that the brand-specific effects of the carriers are statis-
tically significant.
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Table 6. Description of Simulation Sample
Integration steps
Announcement 2Q. 2008
Completion 4Q. 2009
Resulting entity Delta Airlines
Simulation sample (pre-merger)
Sample period 4Q. 2007 ∼ 1Q. 2008
Number of markets overlapped 1,129
- Duopoly / Oligopoly markets 9 / 1,120
Statistics by carrier Delta Airlines Northwest Airlines
Passenger share (per market) (%) 0.17 0.17
Number of products (per market) 2.62 2.13
Fare ($100) 3.81 3.35
On-time performance (%) 0.80 0.70
Flight frequency (per day) 4.51 3.35
Mishandled boarding rate (per 1,000 passengers) 7.51 4.67
Denied boarding rate (per 1,0000 passengers) 1.45 0.70
Notes: Simulation sample consists of the last two quarters of the estimation sample.
The simulation is conducted for 1,129 overlapped market pre-merger.
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Table 7. Changes in Price and Characteristics of Merged Firm’s Products
in Oligopoly Markets
A. Large share goods
Pre-merger Post-merger Change
Quality index 1.319 1.330 0.011
Ontime15 0.756 0.756 0.000
Frequency 4.369 4.438 0.069
Mishandled Baggage rate 6.287 6.249 -0.038
Denied Boarding rate 1.141 1.131 -0.010
Quality Distance
Within-firm distance 0.179 0.200 0.021
Within-market distance 0.111 0.107 -0.004
Pre GP − Pre GFL − Pre GH − Pre GFL −GH
Fare($) 368.6 4.9 3.7 1.5 2.2
Marginal cost ($) 209.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Passengers 327.4 -2.6 0.3 4.1 -3.8
Profits ($100) 591.2 1.9 6.4 5.4 1.0
Notes: Large share goods include 692 products in 680 markets. Each number
indicates average values over the large goods.
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B. Medium share goods
Pre-merger Post-merger Change
Quality index 1.306 1.315 0.008
Ontime15 0.759 0.759 0.000
Frequency 4.097 4.166 0.068
Mishandled Baggage rate 6.241 6.222 -0.019
Denied Boarding rate 1.134 1.128 -0.006
Quality Distance
Within-firm distance 0.096 0.106 0.011
Within-market distance 0.080 0.081 0.001
Pre GP − Pre GFL − Pre GH − Pre GFL −GH
Fare($) 352.8 9.5 7.2 0.3 6.9
Marginal cost ($) 229.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Passengers 47.7 -2.0 -0.8 1.2 -2.1
Profits ($100) 69.4 0.3 1.7 1.3 0.4
Notes: Medium share goods include 1,041 products in 676 markets. Each
number indicates average values over the medium goods.
C. Small share goods
Pre-merger Post-merger Change
Quality index 1.285 1.272 -0.013
Ontime15 0.754 0.754 0.000
Frequency 3.889 3.776 -0.113
Mishandled Baggage rate 6.230 6.263 0.033
Denied Boarding rate 1.108 1.119 0.011
Quality Distance
Within-firm distance 0.064 0.075 0.012
Within-market distance 0.058 0.064 0.006
Pre GP − Pre GFL − Pre GH − Pre GFL −GH
Fare($) 361.1 24.1 36.0 1.9 34.2
Marginal cost ($) 233.9 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0
Passengers 12.4 -1.0 -1.0 0.2 -1.2
Profits ($100) 19.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.1
Notes: Small share goods include 3,598 products in 865 markets. Each number
indicates average values over the small goods.
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Table 8. Changes in Price and Characteristics of Merged Firm’s Products
in Monopoly Markets
A. Large share goods
Pre-merger Post-merger Change
Quality index 1.342 1.428 0.086
Ontime15 0.753 0.751 -0.001
Frequency 2.241 2.950 0.709
Mishandled Baggage rate 4.667 4.449 -0.217
Denied Boarding rate 0.663 0.590 -0.073
Quality Distance
Within-firm distance 0.097 0.295 0.199
Within-market distance – – –
Pre GP − Pre GFL − Pre GH − Pre GFL −GH
Fare($) 428.0 60.9 26.6 1.6 25.0
Marginal cost ($) 115.1 0.0 -1.5 -1.5 0.0
Passengers 53.3 -3.6 3.8 5.5 -1.7
Profits ($100) 201.7 1.5 14.0 12.2 1.8
Notes: Large share goods include 6 products in 6 markets. Each number
indicates average values over the large goods.
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B. Medium share goods
Pre-merger Post-merger Change
Quality index 1.350 1.362 0.012
Ontime15 0.796 0.796 0.000
Frequency 3.371 3.553 0.182
Mishandled Baggage rate 6.091 6.115 0.024
Denied Boarding rate 1.061 1.069 0.008
Quality Distance
Within-firm distance 0.059 0.209 0.150
Within-market distance – – –
Pre GP − Pre GFL − Pre GH − Pre GFL −GH
Fare($) 370.3 65.0 48.0 2.3 45.7
Marginal cost ($) 175.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.0
Passengers 16.3 -2.5 0.8 2.9 -2.1
Profits ($100) 28.5 1.0 4.9 4.3 0.5
Notes: Medium share goods include 8 products in 5 markets. Each number
indicates average values over the medium goods.
C. Small share goods
Pre-merger Post-merger Change
Quality index 1.328 1.230 -0.098
Ontime15 0.777 0.779 0.002
Frequency 3.271 2.445 -0.826
Mishandled Baggage rate 6.074 6.335 0.261
Denied Boarding rate 0.962 1.032 0.070
Quality Distance
Within-firm distance 0.102 0.218 0.116
Within-market distance – – –
Pre GP − Pre GFL − Pre GH − Pre GFL −GH
Fare($) 336.8 113.4 147.0 1.8 145.2
Marginal cost ($) 191.3 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0
Passengers 7.8 -1.8 -2.6 -1.1 -1.4
Profits ($100) 11.0 0.4 -0.4 -1.0 0.5
Notes: Small share goods include 14 products in 6 markets. Each number
indicates average values over the small goods.
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Table 9. Change in Consumer Surplus (CS)
after the Delta and Northwest Airlines Merger
Price model (GP ) Full model (GFL)
Quality change
of DL/NW
Number of
products
(markets)
Markets Change in CS Change in CS
($100K) (%) ($100K) (%)
All markets
Total -15.59 -0.18 18.53 0.21
-0.006
18,430
(1,129)
Business -9.87 -0.12 22.16 0.28
Tourists -5.72 -0.72 -3.63 -0.45
By market competitiveness
Monopoly -0.14 -4.18 0.06 1.73
-0.027
28
(9)
Business -0.08 -2.63 0.07 2.30
Tourists -0.06 -22.81 -0.01 -5.13
Oligopoly -15.45 -0.18 18.47 0.21
-0.006
18,402
(1,120)
Business -9.79 -0.12 22.09 0.28
Tourists -5.66 -0.71 -3.62 -0.45
By quality change
QI markets -12.75 -0.19 19.86 0.30
0.012
12,782
(712)
Business -8.22 -0.14 22.05 0.36
Tourists -4.53 -0.69 -2.19 -0.33
QD markets -2.84 -0.14 -1.34 -0.07
-0.042
5,648
(417)
Business -1.65 -0.09 0.11 0.01
Tourists -1.18 -0.83 -1.44 -1.01
Notes: QI and QD markets indicate quality-increase and quality-decrease markets, respectively.
If a passenger-weighted average quality of merged firm’s products increases after the merger, it
belongs to QI markets, otherwise it belongs to QD markets. Number of products counts not
only merged firm’s products but also competitors’ products.
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Table 12. Market Competitiveness of QI and QD markets Pre-merger
QI markets QD markets
Number of rival firms (within a market) 4.56 3.93
Number of LCCs (within a market) 1.73 1.45
Number of rival routes (within a market) 12.06 8.60
Delta/Northwest only
Passenger share 0.29 0.37
Percentage of flights originating from hub 0.08 0.09
Notes: Each number indicates average values.
Table 13. Comparison of Average Market Frequency (AMF):
Pre-merger vs. Post-merger (Simulated) vs. Post-merger (Actual)
Pre-merger
Post-merger
(Simulated)
Post-merger
(Actual)
Number of
markets
Average market frequency
All markets 14.10 13.77 13.64 244
Monopoly 8.17 6.15 4.43 3
Oligopoly 14.17 13.86 13.75 241
QI markets 15.27 16.02 17.79 117
QD markets 13.02 11.69 9.82 127
Measures of market similarity
Number of carriers 6.00 5.00 5.03 244
Number of LCCs 1.35 1.35 1.38 244
Number of routes 10.81 10.81 9.59 244
Notes: Market frequency (MF) is defined as sum of frequency of each product
provided by merging/merged carriers in a market: MFt =
∑Jft
j=1 Frequencyjt,
where j is a product and t is a market. Then, average market frequency (AMF)
is mean value of market frequency across markets: AMF = 1T
∑T
t=1MFt.
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Table 15. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Competition Plan Variables
GateShareOrigin Percentage of gates leased on an exclusive or preferen-
tial agreement to an airline at origin airport
0.14 0.22 0 0.79
GateShareDest Percentage of gates leased on an exclusive or preferen-
tial agreement to an airline at destination airport
0.12 0.20 0 0.79
SubleaseOrigin 1 if sublease agreement exists at origin airport 0.67 0.47 0 1
SubleaseDest 1 if sublease agreement exists at destination airport 0.66 0.47 0 1
MiiOrigin 1 if origin airport allows MII clauses 0.73 0.44 0 1
MiiDest 1 if destination airport allows MII clauses 0.73 0.45 0 1
Controls
Fare Ticket fare($100) 4.47 2.79 0.50 17.50
Layovers Number of connections(0/2) 1.25 0.97 0 2
Frequency Number of average daily departures 5.33 3.06 0.01 25.56
HubOrigin 1 if a flight departs from hub airport 0.22 0.41 0 1
HubDest 1 if a flight arrives at hub airport 0.17 0.37 0 1
Distance Market distance(Round trip)(1,000miles) 2.87 1.45 0.13 10.17
Tour 1 if origin or destination airport is in either FL or NV 0.09 0.29 0 1
LCC 1 if a carrier is a LCC 0.10 0.30 0 1
LCCNum Number of LCCs within a market 0.74 0.66 0 3
PopOrigin Population of origin city(million) 3.74 2.39 0.35 9.81
PopDest Population of destination city(million) 3.66 2.40 0.35 9.81
Slot-control Number of slot-controlled airports on itinerary 0.32 0.60 0 4
Nseat Numner of seats in aircraft(100) 1.25 0.35 0.3 2.57
CongestedOrigin Ratio of average daily departures over the total num-
ber of boarding gates at origin airport(standardized)
0 1 -1.71 2.52
CongestedDest Ratio of average daily departures over the to-
tal number of boarding gates at destination air-
port(standardized)
0 1 -1.71 2.50
Carrier Dummies
AA 1 if a carrier is American Airline 0.15 0.36 0 1
CO 1 if a carrier is Continental Airline 0.08 0.27 0 1
DL 1 if a carrier is Delta Airline 0.13 0.34 0 1
NW 1 if a carrier is Northwest Airline 0.11 0.31 0 1
UA 1 if a carrier is United Airline 0.12 0.32 0 1
US 1 if a carrier is US Airway 0.04 0.18 0 1
B6 1 if a carrier is JetBlue 0.001 0.03 0 1
WN 1 if a carrier is Southwest Airline 0.06 0.23 0 1
OT 1 if a carrier is other carrier 0.31 0.46 0 1
Notes: The data include thirty one Airport Competition Plans, DB1B Origin and Destination Survey (2004.2Q),
and T-100 Segment database (April 2004-June 2004). The final sample has 58,612 products in 888 markets.
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Table 16. Terminal Rental Rates and Landing Fees
Terminal Rental Rate ($) Landing Fee ($) Effective
Airport Signatory Non-sig. Signatory Non-sig. Date
Anchorage 61.5 76.9 1.6 2.0 7.1.2012
Atlanta 85.0 117.5 0.8 1.5 9.1.2011
Dallas/Fort Worth 103.8 130.7 3.0 3.8 10.1.2011
Detroit 60.0 69.0 3.7 4.7 10.1.2012
Chicago O’hare 82.0 110.7 5.7 7.2 1.1.2012
Notes : The information on rates and fees are collected vis official website of each
airport. Figures represent price per sqft per year for terminal rental rate, and
price per 1,000 lbs for landing fees.
Table 17. Tenant and Sub-tenant Relationships at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport
Terminal Primary tenant Sub-tenant
A/C American American Eagle, TACA, Sabena
B Continental America West, Frontier
B Trans World Vanguard
B US Airways Midwest Express
E Delta Atlantic Southeast, AeroMexico, Canadian Airlines
Notes : This table is based on 2001 Competition Plan of Dallas/Fort Worth.
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Table 18. Summary of Gate Agreement, Sublease Agreement, and MII Clauses
at Thirty One Airports
Airport
Total Exclusive Common Sublease MII Hub C.P. collected
gate gate (%) gate (%) agreement clauses carrier used not used
Albuquerque 22 0.68 0.32 0 1 2006
Anchorage 29 0.83 0.17 1 1 AS 2004 2003
Atlanta 176 0.81 0.19 1 1 DL 2004 2002
Austin 24 0.58 0.42 1 0 2002
Nashville 51 0.9 0.1 0 1 2002
Burbank 14 0.79 0.21 0 1 2002 2001
Dallas Love 26 0.73 0.27 0 0 2004 2002
Washington Reagan 44 0.95 0.05 1 1 2002
Dallas/Fort Worth 137 0.93 0.07 1 1 AA,DL 2004 2001,2002
Detroit 86 1 0 1 1 NW 2004 2000,2001
Newark 96 0.99 0.01 1 0 CO 2004 2000
Houston Hobby 24 0.92 0.08 0 0 2004 2002
Washington Dulles 96 0.88 0.13 0 1 UA,US 2004
Houston 103 0.97 0.03 1 0 CO 2004 2002
Chicago Midway 34 0.94 0.06 0 1 NW 2004
Memphis 81 0.93 0.07 1 1 NW 2004
Milwaukee 42 1 0 1 1 F9,FL 2002 2007
Minneapolis 77 0.9 0.1 1 1 NW 2004 2000
Oakland 24 0.88 0.13 1 0 2004
Ontario 26 0.77 0.23 0 1 2001
Chicago O’hare 157 0.99 0.01 1 1 AA,UA 2004
Palm Beach 29 0.83 0.17 0 1 2002
Philadelphia 120 0.91 0.09 1 1 US 2004 2000
Phoenix 95 0.94 0.06 0 0 HP 2002
Providence 21 0.95 0.05 1 1 2004 2002
Reno 23 0.74 0.26 0 1 2004
San Antonio 23 0.83 0.17 1 0 2004
San Francisco 85 0.67 0.33 1 1 UA 2003 2000,2001
San Jose 31 0.81 0.19 0 1 2004 2008
Salt Lake City 81 0.88 0.12 0 0 DL 2004
Tucson 19 0.74 0.26 0 1 2007
Notes: Exclusive gate is the percentage of gates leased on exclusive or preferential agreements to all airlines
serving an airport. Common gate represents the percentage of gates available for common use under an airport’s
own control.
114
Table 19. Contractual Practices at San Francisco International Airport
Exclusive and
Preferential Gates 2000 2001 2003
Alaska 3 3 3
American 8 8 8
Continental 5 5 5
Delta 8 8 8
Northwest 3 3 3
United 23 23 23
US Airways 5 5 3
TWA 7 7 0
Southwest 2 0 0
ATA 0 0 2
America West 0 0 2
Total Exclusive Gates 64 (0.86) 62 (0.73) 57 (0.67)
Common Gates 10 (0.14) 23 (0.27) 24 (0.28)
Vacant 0 0 4(0.05)
Total Gates 74 85 85
Sublease agreement existed existed existed
MII clauses allowed allowed allowed
Notes : This table is based on 2000, 2001, and 2003 Compe-
tition Plan of San Francisco Airport. Figures in parenthesis
indicate percentage.
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Table 20. Estimation Results on Model Parameters
in Reduced-form Pricing Equation
OLS IV
Dependent: Fare ($100) 1 2 3 1 2 3
HubOrigin 0.885*** 0.450*** 0.785*** 0.457***
(0.033) (0.045) (0.037) (0.046)
HubDest 0.566*** 0.291*** 0.447*** 0.298***
(0.037) (0.049) (0.042) (0.051)
GateShareOrigin 1.929*** 1.390*** 1.855*** 1.405***
(0.064) (0.086) (0.072) (0.089)
GateShareDest 1.242*** 0.969*** 1.154*** 0.987***
(0.071) (0.093) (0.081) (0.097)
SubleaseOrigin 0.193*** 0.203*** 0.175*** 0.209***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
SubleaseDest 0.347*** 0.364*** 0.332*** 0.369***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
MiiOrigin 0.035 0.038 0.039 0.037
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
MiiDest 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.132*** 0.124***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Layovers -0.418*** -0.413*** -0.348*** -0.528*** -0.453*** -0.335***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)
lnDistance 1.136*** 1.167*** 1.140*** 1.251*** 1.207*** 1.128***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Frequency 0.070*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.140*** 0.079*** 0.040**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Slot-control 0.009 0.015 -0.000 -0.029 -0.000 0.004
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Tour -0.406*** -0.328*** -0.304*** -0.371*** -0.324*** -0.304***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Nseat -0.445*** -0.364*** -0.426*** -0.594*** -0.425*** -0.409***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054)
LCC -0.253*** -0.298*** -0.293*** -0.210*** -0.279*** -0.298***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
LCCNum -0.278*** -0.264*** -0.246*** -0.269*** -0.262*** -0.246***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
PopOrigin -0.049*** -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.053*** -0.023*** -0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
PopDest -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 4.716*** 3.907*** 3.960*** 4.534*** 3.878*** 3.970***
(0.071) (0.079) (0.079) (0.077) (0.080) (0.081)
Carrier dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 58,612 58,612 58,612 58,612 58,612 58,612
Adjusted R-sq 0.094 0.102 0.104 0.090 0.101 0.104
Notes:Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 95%, 99%, 99.9% level of significance. The
coefficients of carrier dummies are not reported here. They are available upon request.
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Table 21. Estimation Results on Model Parameters in Structural Model
Demand Variables Cost Variables
(Random Vars.) (Competition Plan)
Fare1 -0.639***(0.033) GateShareOrigin -0.504*(0.296)
GateShare1 0.580**(0.291) GateShareDest -0.262(0.289)
Layovers1 -0.436***(0.027) SubleaseOrigin 0.094***(0.016)
Fare2 -0.077***(0.002) SubleaseDest 0.123***(0.016)
GateShare2 0.917***(0.183) MiiOrigin 0.002(0.014)
Layovers2 -0.572***(0.024) MiiDest 0.003(0.014)
(Controls) (Controls)
lnDistance 0.212***(0.029) Distance-short 0.213***(0.015)
Frequency 0.054***(0.004) Distance-long 0.122***(0.008)
Slot-control -0.074***(0.016) Layovers-short 0.226***(0.049)
Tour 0.266***(0.057) Layovers-long 0.292***(0.051)
Nseat 0.382***(0.032)
(Carrier Dummies) (Carrier Dummies)
CO -0.065**(0.032) CO 0.086***(0.021)
DL -0.210***(0.029) DL -0.141***(0.016)
NW -0.065*(0.033) NW -0.052**(0.023)
UA -0.063**(0.025) UA -0.006(0.017)
US -0.300***(0.044) US -0.029(0.034)
B6 0.529***(0.107) B6 -0.186***(0.058)
WN 0.062(0.047) WN -0.139***(0.027)
OT 0.091***(0.028) OT 0.025(0.015)
(Other Coef.) (Other Coef.)
Constant -11.096***(0.157) Constant 0.232(0.176)
λ 0.728***(0.013)
γ 0.873***(0.020)
Function Value: 38.467
First-order Optimality: 0.098
Observations: 58,612
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 90%, 95%, 99% level of signifi-
cance.
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Table 22. (Base Case) Structural Model with Airport Congestion Measure
Demand Variables Cost Variables
(Random Vars.) (Competition Plan)
Fare1 -0.638***(0.036) GateShareOrigin*CongestOrg -0.266***(0.083)
GateShare1 0.715**(0.354) GateShareDest*CongestDst -0.254***(0.087)
Layovers1 -0.430***(0.035) GateShareOrigin -0.301(0.357)
Fare2 -0.080***(0.003) GateShareDest -0.038(0.347)
GateShare2 0.776***(0.205) SubleaseOrigin*CongestOrg 0.064*(0.038)
Layovers2 -0.553***(0.026) SubleaseDest*CongestDst -0.005(0.038)
(Controls) SubleaseOrigin 0.116***(0.021)
lnDistance 0.197***(0.029) SubleaseDest 0.102***(0.021)
Frequency 0.053***(0.004) MiiOrigin*CongestOrg 0.140***(0.048)
Slot-control -0.067***(0.016) MiiDest*CongestDst 0.210***(0.051)
Tour 0.257***(0.059) MiiOrigin -0.005(0.018)
Nseat 0.385***(0.032) MiiDest 0.013(0.018)
Carrier Dummies Yes CongestedOrigin -0.154***(0.047)
(Other Coef.) CongestedDest -0.148***(0.047)
Constant -11.095***(0.169) (Controls)
λ 0.712***(0.014) Distance-short 0.216***(0.017)
γ 0.850***(0.026) Distance-long 0.133***(0.009)
Function Value: 38.218 Layovers-short 0.216***(0.068)
First-order Optimality: 0.065 Layovers-long 0.277***(0.069)
Observations: 58,612 Carrier Dummies Yes
(Other Coef.)
Constant 0.111(0.217)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 90%, 95%, 99% level of signifi-
cance.
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Table 23. Hub Specifications
Hub Only Hub and Gate-control
Demand Variables
Fare1 -0.618***(0.034) -0.636***(0.036)
HubDM1 0.172***(0.023) 0.061*(0.033)
Layovers1 -0.420***(0.028) -0.408***(0.028)
Fare2 -0.077***(0.003) -0.078***(0.003)
HubDM2 0.137***(0.020) 0.023(0.030)
Layovers2 -0.548***(0.023) -0.562***(0.024)
GateShare No 0.669***(0.131)
(Controls) Yes Yes
Cost Variables
(Competition Plan) Yes Yes
(Controls) Yes Yes
Function Value 38.702 38.288
First-order Optimality 0.018 0.027
Observations 58,612 58,612
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 90%,
95%, 99% level of significance. Estimates for cost variables are
very similar to those in table 21 in terms of figures and significance
levels. Results are available upon request.
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Table 25. Elasticity Estimates on Price and Gate
Base Long Non Small Large 2004
Price Elasticity Case Market Monopoly Bin Bin C.Plans
Type One -3.99 -2.05 -3.95 -4.09 -3.75 -3.11
Type Two -0.50 -0.33 -0.50 -0.49 -0.47 -0.42
Both Types -2.37 -0.96 -2.36 -2.23 -2.25 -1.65
Gate Elasticity
Type One 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.17
Type Two 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.04
Both Types 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.10
% of Population (γ)
Type One 0.85 0.72 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.74
Type Two 0.15 0.28 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.26
% of Passengers
Type One 0.54 0.36 0.54 0.48 0.54 0.46
Type Two 0.46 0.64 0.46 0.52 0.46 0.54
Notes : Price elasticity measures the percentage change in demand as prices
of all products increase by 1%. Similarly, gate elasticity indicates the per-
centage change in demand when the number of gates controlled by each
carrier increase by 1%. The percentage of population (γ) refers to per-
centage of type 1 and 2 passengers in the population. The percentage of
passengers denotes the percentage of type 1 and 2 passengers who actually
bought airline tickets.
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Table 26. Predicted Marginal Cost and Profits for Base Case at Congested Airports
(At airports where congestion measure>0)
Fare MC Markup Quantity Profit Revenue
All airports ($100) ($100) (%) (100) ($100k) ($100k)
Signatory 4.65 0.82 0.85 7.77 2.23 2.40
Non-Sig. 4.16 0.94 0.79 3.47 0.87 1.03
Airports with Sublease
Signatory 4.75 0.81 0.85 9.09 2.78 3.08
Non-Sig. 4.33 0.96 0.79 3.90 1.03 1.23
Airports with MII Clauses
Signatory 4.74 0.85 0.84 8.01 2.43 2.69
Non-Sig. 4.14 0.90 0.80 3.83 0.96 1.12
Carrier
American 5.08 0.90 0.84 2.25 0.72 0.83
Continental 4.46 1.16 0.73 0.54 0.15 0.18
Delta 4.51 0.73 0.90 1.82 0.52 0.58
Northwest 4.95 0.68 0.87 2.41 0.83 0.91
United 4.62 0.97 0.79 1.57 0.43 0.49
US Airways 3.81 0.88 0.76 0.43 0.10 0.12
Jet Blue 3.95 0.58 0.86 4.64 1.12 1.38
Southwest 3.29 0.50 0.91 5.37 1.18 1.03
Others 3.98 0.96 0.77 1.99 0.46 0.57
Notes : Fare, marginal costs, and markups are average values for prod-
ucts specified above. Quantity, profits, and revenues are average values
per market.
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Table 27. Predicted Marginal Cost and Profits for Base Case
at Highly Congested Airports
(At airports where congestion measure>1)
Fare MC Markup Quantity Profit Revenue
All airports ($100) ($100) (%) (100) ($100k) ($100k)
Signatory 4.79 0.85 0.83 7.07 2.22 2.41
Non-sig. 4.25 0.89 0.80 5.37 1.37 1.58
Airports with Sublease
Signatory 4.79 0.85 0.83 7.07 2.22 2.41
Non-sig. 4.40 0.94 0.79 4.93 1.31 1.55
Airports with MII Clauses
Signatory 4.85 0.87 0.82 6.76 2.27 2.55
Non-sig. 4.18 0.85 0.82 5.82 1.47 1.68
Carrier
American 4.86 0.95 0.82 1.88 0.53 0.62
Continental 4.55 1.13 0.74 0.52 0.15 0.19
Delta 3.97 0.92 0.80 0.56 0.14 0.17
Northwest 5.17 0.61 0.90 3.56 1.26 1.37
United 4.79 0.91 0.81 2.45 0.68 0.78
US Airways 3.93 0.78 0.80 0.51 0.13 0.15
Jet Blue 3.95 0.58 0.86 4.64 1.12 1.38
Southwest 3.35 0.59 0.87 4.63 1.03 0.93
Others 3.95 1.00 0.76 1.64 0.38 0.46
Notes : Fare, marginal costs, and markups are average values for prod-
ucts specified above. Quantity, profits, and revenues are average values
per market.
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Table 29. Counterfactual Analysis with Reduction in Exclusive Gates
at Congested Airports
(At airports where congestion measure>0)
New Fare MC Markup Quantity Profit Revenue
75% ceiling ($100) ($100) (%) (100) ($100k) ($100k)
Signatory 4.66 0.84 0.84 7.22 2.09 2.27
Non-sig. 4.17 0.94 0.79 3.35 0.84 1.00
50% ceiling
Signatory 4.84 0.89 0.83 6.63 1.91 2.12
Non-sig. 4.17 0.94 0.79 3.31 0.84 0.99
25% ceiling
Signatory 4.76 0.94 0.82 6.11 1.76 1.98
Non-sig. 4.16 0.94 0.79 3.29 0.83 0.98
Carrier (based on 50% reduction)
American 5.11 0.96 0.83 1.94 0.62 0.73
Continental 4.47 1.16 0.73 0.48 0.13 0.16
Delta 4.53 0.78 0.88 1.56 0.46 0.52
Northwest 5.67 0.82 0.84 1.83 0.66 0.75
United 4.62 0.97 0.79 1.49 0.41 0.47
US Airways 3.86 0.91 0.76 0.38 0.09 0.11
Jet Blue 3.92 0.58 0.87 4.65 1.17 1.43
Southwest 3.38 0.55 0.90 4.75 1.05 0.94
Others 3.99 0.97 0.77 1.97 0.47 0.57
Notes : Fare, marginal costs, and markups are average values for products
specified above. Quantity, profits, and revenues are average values per mar-
ket.
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Table 30. Counterfactual Analysis with Reduction in Exclusive Gates
at Highly Congested Airports
(At airports where congestion measure>1)
New Fare MC Markup Quantity Profit Revenue
75% ceiling ($100) ($100) (%) (100) ($100k) ($100k)
Signatory 4.81 0.88 0.82 6.48 2.07 2.26
Non-sig. 4.26 0.89 0.81 5.17 1.32 1.52
50% ceiling
Signatory 5.23 0.94 0.81 5.91 1.87 2.08
Non-sig. 4.26 0.89 0.81 5.08 1.30 1.50
25% ceiling
Signatory 5.02 1.00 0.80 5.37 1.69 1.93
Non-sig. 4.26 0.89 0.80 5.04 1.29 1.49
Carrier (based on 50% reduction)
American 4.87 0.97 0.81 1.76 0.49 0.59
Continental 4.56 1.13 0.74 0.46 0.13 0.16
Delta 3.98 0.94 0.80 0.51 0.13 0.16
Northwest 6.06 0.78 0.87 2.66 0.99 1.12
United 4.79 0.90 0.82 2.30 0.64 0.73
US Airways 3.99 0.83 0.79 0.44 0.11 0.13
Jet Blue 3.92 0.58 0.87 4.65 1.17 1.43
Southwest 3.36 0.59 0.88 4.31 0.96 0.86
Others 3.95 1.00 0.76 1.66 0.39 0.48
Notes : Fare, marginal costs, and markups are average values for products
specified above. Quantity, profits, and revenues are average values per mar-
ket.
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Figure 1. An Illustration of Market and Product
Notes: O, D, C indicate origin, destination, and connecting city, respec-
tively. Given carrier, roundtrip ORD-IAH, ORD-DFW-IAH, and MDW-
IAH are considered as different products.
Figure 2. Operating Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM)
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Notes: Data sources of CASM are Air Carrier Financial Statistics (Schedule
P- 12) and T-100 Domestic Segment from U.S. DOT.
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Figure 3. Simulation Design for Decomposing Sources of Price Change
Notes: Pre is the actual pre-merger data. GP and GFL indicate
games based on the price model and the full model. P is a price
and X is a vector of the endogenous product characteristics. GH
is a hypothetical game.
Figure 4. Measures for the Extent of Product Differentiation:
Within-firm distance and Within-market distance
Notes: Within-firm distance of a product is the closest quality-distance from itself
to other goods produced by the same firm. Within-market distance of a product
the closest quality-distance from itself to other goods produced by competitors.
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Figure 5. Quality Changes of Merged Firm’s Products in All Markets
By market power
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Figure 6. Quality Changes of Merged Firm’s Products in Oligopoly Markets
By product group
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Figure 7. Quality Changes of Merged Firm’s Products in Monopoly Markets
By product group
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Figure 10: Total Gates and Exclusive or Preferential Gates
(Thirty one airports subjected to Airport Competition Plan)
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Figure 11: Fare and Product Share
(1,500 miles < Market Distance < 2,000 miles)
Business travelers are less sensitive to price increase
Tourist travelers are more sensitive to price increase
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